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Understanding the power of situations in shaping basic human processes has been 
central to social psychological research. A variety of situations have been examined, 
ranging from the mere or imagined presence of others (Allport, 1985; Rigdon, Ishii, 
Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009), to group dynamics (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Lewin, 1952), to 
macro-factors such as socioeconomic status (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Stephens, 
Markus, & Townsend, 2007) and physical environment (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 
2006). In this dissertation, I focus on one potent social factor, culture, which has received 
much scholarly attention for the last two decades. Culture is an integral part of virtually 
all psychological phenomena. It is built into most behavioral and psychological 
processes, from our everyday attentional habits (e.g., which TV ads to watch), to our 
emotional experiences (e.g., when I feel happy), to our decision-making processes (e.g., 
which restaurant to go for dinner). In the present work, I examine how cultural 
environments shape basic human processes such as cognition, emotion, and motivation 
by comparing Western and East Asian cultures. 
All cultural regions are comprised of a unique constellation of daily practices, 
public artifacts, and folk beliefs that foster the development of distinct psychological 







of culturally shared models of the self as independent (dominant in Western cultures) or 
interdependent (dominant in East Asian cultures) (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Park 
& Kitayama, in press). The last two decades of cultural psychological research have 
documented cultural variations in psychological tendencies in cognition, emotion, and 
motivation, depending on each culture’s relative emphasis on independence or 
interdependence. For example, the cultural model of the self as independent (vs. 
interdependent) involves cognitive processes such as dispositional (vs. situational) 
attribution (Morris & Peng, 1994) and focused (vs. holistic) attention (Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001). It is also likely to give rise to distinct emotional processes such as the experience 
of socially disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 
2006) and personal (vs. social) forms of happiness (Uchida & Kitayama, 2009), as well 
as motivational processes such as personally (vs. socially) oriented motivation (Na & 
Kitayama, 2012) and self-enhancement (vs. self-criticism) (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999). 
In the present work, I aim to extend the current literature of cross-cultural 
psychology in two important directions. First, previous work provides much evidence on 
the psychological consequences of independent or interdependent self-construal, but it 
leaves several important questions unanswered. I seek to add to this literature by focusing 
particularly on three classes of questions, each of which deals with the cognitive, 
emotional, or motivational processes associated with independence vs. interdependence. 
My second aim is to examine the neural basis underlying cultural variation. Much 
research in this field has used traditional methods of social psychology, such as 







phenomena including attitudes, emotional experiences, and motivation. However, in 
order to understand the mechanisms through which these cultural differences emerge, it is 
essential to examine more basic-level processes, such as how quickly and automatically 
cultural modulation takes place. Neuroscience investigations allow researchers to 
examine how culture influences the psychological mechanism and structure of 
individuals, through rapid and concurrent observation of the neural processes underlying 
them. Thus, by adopting a neurophysiological measure (i.e., event-related brain 
potentials; ERP), I explore the neural basis of cultural variation in motivational processes.  
Models of the Self as Independent and Interdependent 
The present work rests on the hypothesis that cultures vary in the nature of the 
self they sanction. In Western cultures, including U.S. society, independence of the self is 
highly sanctioned. The self is regarded as a relatively autonomous, self-sufficient entity 
that is independent from its surrounding interpersonal context (Triandis, 1989). As such, 
individuals in these cultures are likely to define themselves in terms of internal attributes 
such as preferences, attitudes, and goals. The self is thus affirmed when these internal 
attributes are realized and evaluated as positive. This model of the self is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1-A.  
Conversely, in many non-Western cultures, especially East Asian cultures, a 
greater premium is placed on interdependence of the self with others. The fundamental 
sense of Asian selfhood is embedded in social relations. As such, individuals in these 
cultures are likely to define themselves in terms of relational attributes such as social 







that they are meeting social roles, norms, and expectations of others. This model of the 
self is illustrated in Figure 1.1-B.  
Evidence for this theoretical framework is derived from many different sources. 
For example, Cousins (1989; see also, Brewer & Yuki, 2007) asked both European 
American and Asian participants to describe themselves by completing twenty statements 
starting with “I am…” (Twenty Statement Test; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Consistent 
with the model of the self as independent, European Americans tended to describe 
themselves in terms of abstract personal attributes that were detached from social 
contexts or social relations (e.g., I am outgoing). In contrast, consistent with the model of 
the self as interdependent, Asians tended to describe themselves in terms of their 
relational attributes or social roles (e.g., I am the second daughter in my family). A recent 
investigation (Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007) revealed that there is a neurophysiological 
root to cultural differences in the structure of the self. These researchers found that the 
brain region known to be involved in self-processing (medial prefrontal cortex, mPFC; 
Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002) showed equally strong activation when Chinese 
participants thought about and elaborated on their mothers vs. the self, suggesting that 
significant others are incorporated into the definition of the self. In contrast, for 
Westerners, mPFC received activation only when they thought about themselves, but not 
when they thought about their mothers, suggesting that Westerners have distinctive 
neural representations of the self and close others.  
To the extent that individuals actively engage in their culture, which emphasizes 
either independence or interdependence, this can shape a variety of psychological 







cultural psychology have documented numerous cross-cultural differences in basic 
psychological processes. This dissertation focuses on three such processes – cognition, 
emotion, and motivation. In this introduction, I will summarize the overall East-West 
cultural differences that have been identified, and then introduce the research questions 
that I have explored in an effort to extend the current findings in each domain.  
Culture and Cognition 
 One of the most studied areas in cultural psychology is cultural variation in 
cognitive styles, such as attentional processes and social perception. Since Western 
cultures place strong emphasis on personal goals and desires, individuals are likely to 
allocate attention primarily to objects and events closely relevant to their goals and 
desires. This process may, in turn, foster the development of focused attention. In 
contrast, since Asian cultures more strongly emphasize social embeddedness and social 
relations, Asians are likely to allocate attention more broadly to the outer social world. As 
a consequence, their attention may eventually become holistic. In support of this analysis, 
it has been amply demonstrated that people in Western cultures tend to allocate their 
attention to focal objects in lieu of situational contexts, while those in Asian cultures tend 
to be more holistic, extending their attention to situational contexts (Kitayama, Duffy, 
Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003).  
A similar cultural variation has been documented in the domain of social 
perception in which a person is considered a focal object embedded in a larger social 
scene. It may be anticipated that independent people are likely to attend to a person more 
as a figural object, while paying relatively scant attention to the context. In contrast, it 







context. Consistent with this prediction, European Americans show a greater tendency to 
explain another person’s behavior based primarily on that person’s dispositions, while 
discounting available situational factors (called fundamental attribution error; FAE, Ross, 
1977). However, this bias is much weaker among Asians, who tend to attend more 
holistically to situational constraints on the focal behavior (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; 
Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Na & Kitayama, 2011).  
While studies have shed some significant light on how culture influences the way 
we think, this line of research is largely limited to basic cognitive processes such as 
attention or reasoning. Many other cognitive processes hold the potential for meaningful 
cross-cultural comparisons. Implicit attitude toward cultural values is one such topic. 
While it has been understudied by cultural psychologists, implicit attitude has received a 
great deal of scholarly attention over the last decade in other domains in social 
psychology (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Thus, Chapter II 
examines whether people differ in their implicit attitudes toward their levels of 
independence or interdependence across cultures (Study 1). Specifically, I examined 
whether European Americans value independence more and interdependence less 
compared to Japanese, when their implicit value endorsements are assessed in a modified 
implicit association test (IAT) paradigm.  
Culture and Emotion 
Emotion is another important domain where substantial cultural variation has 
been observed. Depending on whether a given culture emphasizes a model of the self as 
independent or interdependent, people of that culture tend to experience distinct emotions 







emotions when they succeed in important life tasks, and negative emotions when they fail 
in the tasks. But, the types of positive or negative emotions people feel may differ as a 
function of the nature of tasks that are sanctioned in the culture. In Western cultures, 
people can be assured of positive characteristics of the personal self when independent 
tasks (e.g., personal achievement) are realized. Achieving independent goals then may 
give rise to the experience of socially disengaging positive emotions such as pride or 
confidence. Conversely, when they fail in achieving these goals, they are likely to 
experience socially disengaging negative emotions such as frustration and anger. In 
contrast, actualizing interdependent goals is more strongly emphasized in Asian cultures. 
When interdependent goals (e.g., satisfying social expectation) are achieved, people can 
be assured of their belongingness in social relations, which in turn may lead them to 
experience socially engaging positive emotions such as communal feelings or feelings of 
closeness to others. Conversely, when people fail in these tasks, they are likely to feel 
socially engaging negative emotions such as shame and guilt. In support of this analysis, 
Kitayama and colleagues found that European Americans tend to experience disengaging 
(vs. engaging) emotions more in their daily lives, while the reverse pattern is true for 
Asians (Kitayama et al., 2006; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). 
The experience of engaging (vs. disengaging) emotions also influences the nature 
of happiness across cultures. If people habitually seek to realize either independent or 
interdependent goals, they may feel happy or satisfied when the corresponding goals are 
achieved. As expected, the happiness of Americans is more accurately predicted by the 







explained by the experience of engaging positive emotions (Kitayama et al., 2006; 2009; 
see also Uchida & Kitayama, 2009 for similar findings).  
In Chapter III, I seek to extend the current literature on culture and emotion by 
exploring two research questions that have received little scholarly attention to date. In 
Study 2, I examined whether cultural groups differ in anger expression, and if so, how its 
influence interacts with other macro-social conditions, such as social status. Anger is a 
basic emotion, which is presumed to be observed in all cultures (Izard, 1977; Spielberger, 
Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983). But, specific functions of anger may differ across 
cultures, depending on the normative expectation of independence or interdependence in 
a given culture. I focus on two prominent functions of anger – anger as vented frustration 
and anger as dominance display, which may be differentially normative across cultures 
(i.e., U.S. vs. Japan). Specifically, I tested whether anger expression increases or 
decreases as a function of social status, depending on the salience or prominence of each 
of the two functions of anger in each culture.  
Study 3 examined whether the linkage between receipt of social support and 
physical and mental health is moderated by culture. Previous work provides inconsistent 
results regarding the relationship between social support and health. While some studies 
report strong positive relationships between the two (Lakey & Orehek, 2011; Uchino, 
Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996 for reviews), other studies suggest that support offers 
little benefit to health (see Bolger & Amarel, 2007 for a review). I suggest that the 
linkage between perceived support and health status of the support recipient is moderated 
by multiple factors that serve to highlight or conceal the emotional costs of receiving 







support and health would be more strongly evident among Asians who are from a 
support-approving cultural context. I also consider personality (i.e., neuroticism) and 
situational factors (i.e., stress) as additional influences that jointly moderate the social 
support-health link with culture. 
Culture and Motivation 
The culturally divergent models of the self as independent or interdependent are 
also likely to give rise to corresponding variations in motivational processes. A 
seemingly identical behavioral pattern (i.e., performing a task or making a choice) is 
likely to have different psychological meanings and is thus likely to be guided by very 
different psychological mechanisms across cultures. The present work focuses on two 
notable themes of research that pertain to motivational processes: self-serving bias and 
social evaluative threat.  
With his famous publication of Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (1651) argued that 
self-interest is the cardinal human motive. Since then, the idea that humans are 
predominantly self-interested has been central not only to neo-classic economics (Smith, 
1759), but also to other influential theories of human behavior (Campbell, 1975; 
Greenwald, 1980). One potent psychological manifestation of the pursuit of self-interest 
is self-serving bias. It has been convincingly demonstrated that people are motivated to 
maintain positive self-views and to maximize self-interest in many different ways 
(Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Langer, 1975; Miller & Ross, 1975). 
Although self-serving bias is often regarded as universal, recent investigations report 
substantial cross-cultural variations. European Americans, who are expected to affirm 






others, tend to show stronger self-serving bias than Asians, who are expected to affirm 
their self-identity by maintaining harmonious social relations and conforming to social 
expectations (e.g., Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). 
Another notable demonstration of cultural variation is social evaluative threat and 
its implications for the motivational process. Social belongingness is a fundamental 
human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1988). Therefore, people are 
sometimes highly vigilant of potential social evaluative threats. But, not all individuals 
are equally sensitive to social evaluative threats. Asians, who tend to define themselves 
based primarily on social evaluations such as honor and face, are known to be more 
sensitive to social evaluative threats than European Americans, who tend to define 
themselves in reference to their internal attributes (Kim & Markman, 2006). Under social 
evaluative threats, people tend to monitor their actions more closely and enhance their 
motivation to perform better on a task at hand. Consistent with this prediction, Asians 
show enhanced motivation to work harder on a task when the situation involves social 
evaluative threats (e.g., Na & Kitayama, 2012). Similarly, Asians show increased 
motivation to justify their choice in public (i.e., in the presence of social eyes), while they 
are exposed to a social cue signaling a potential negative evaluation held by others, while 
European Americans do not justify their choice under the same condition (Kitayama, 
Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004).  
Although current evidence clearly suggests that cultural differences in self-
serving bias and social evaluative threat exist, the neural mechanisms underlying these 
phenomena are still unexplored. It is essential to analyze brain pathways to broaden our 






investigations enable researchers to examine the mechanisms underlying cross-cultural 
variation. For example, an exploration of the neural basis of self-serving bias could reveal 
whether self-enhancing motivation stems from conscious self-presentational goals to 
present the self in a favorable light (Schlenker, 1980), or it has an even deeper 
neurophysiological root, in which the pertinent brain mechanisms underlying self-serving 
bias are recruited automatically and unconsciously (Berridge, 2012). 
Second, neuroscience investigations can reveal how quickly and automatically 
cultural modulation takes place. Unlike traditional behavioral measures, which rely on 
observation of downstream outcomes of hypothesized psychological processes (e.g., 
response time), neuroscience measures, such as event-related potentials (ERPs, which 
have extremely high time resolution), enable researchers to assess neural processes more 
rapidly and concurrently. For example, in studies by Kitayama and colleagues (2004) 
reviewed above, choice justification is used as an indicator of motivational significance 
of decisions. Although promising, these measures of motivational significance are distal 
and indirect, which are likely to be influenced by a host of different variables (Harmon-
Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009). To understand psychological mechanisms more 
clearly, it is therefore desirable to assess the change in psychological processes on-line in 
the brain.  
To this end, in Chapter IV, I examined cultural modulation in the motivational 
processes involved in self-serving bias and social evaluative threat by using a 
neuroscience measure. In particular, I assessed error-related negativity (ERN), an ERP 
component contingent on error commission (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & 






index of motivational significance involved in self-serving bias (Study 4) and social 
evaluative threat (Study 5).   
Overview of the Present Work 
In this dissertation, I aim to extend the current literature of cultural psychology by 
exploring how the culturally divergent model of the self as independent vs. 
interdependent influences three arrays of psychological tendencies in broad socio-cultural 
contexts. It also seeks to identify the brain mechanisms upon which these psychological 
operations are based. In particular, Chapter II examines cultural variations in implicit 
attitudes by comparing European American and Japanese participants’ implicit value 
endorsement of independence and interdependence using a modified implicit association 
task (IAT) paradigm (Study 1). Chapter III includes two studies examining cultural 
variations in emotional processes. I examined whether the linkage between anger 
expression and social status is moderated by culture (Study 2), and whether the beneficial 
effects of perceived social support on health is contingent on factors that highlight or 
conceal the emotional costs associated with receiving supporting, including culture 
(Study 3). Chapter IV explores the neural bases of cultural variation in motivational 
processes in two studies. Study 4 examined cultural variation in the neural correlate of 
the motivational force toward the pursuit of self-interest. Study 5 tested whether cultural 
groups differ in the neural signaling of social evaluative threat and how this threat 
response influences task motivation. Finally, in Chapter V, the main findings of Chapters 
II, III, and IV are summarized. I also discuss the implications of the findings and propose 























Culture and Cognition 
 
 One central theme in the last two decades of cultural psychological research is 
that as compared with Asians, European Americans are more independently oriented (or 
less interdependently oriented) (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 
2010). Evidence for this cultural difference is especially strong when implicit 
psychological tendencies of independence (vs. interdependence) are tested (Kitayama et 
al., 2009). These tendencies of independence (vs. interdependence) involve dispositional 
(vs. situational) attribution (Morris & Peng, 1994), focused (vs. holistic) attention 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), personal (vs. social) form of happiness (Uchida & Kitayama, 
2009), as well as personally (vs. socially) oriented motivation (Na & Kitayama, 2012). 
Although much of this cross-cultural evidence is based on behavioral indicators such as 
judgment, response time, and task performance, an increasing volume of work has 
documented conceptually equivalent cultural variations with neural indicators (e.g., Na & 
Kitayama, 2011; Zhu et al., 2008; see Kitayama & Park, 2010, for a review). One 
important shortcoming of this literature, however, is that none of the existing measures 
assess implicit attitudes toward independence (vs. interdependence).  
Implicit attitudes have been investigated extensively over the last decade in social
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






psychology (Greenwald et al., 2009). By implicit attitudes, we mean a set of evaluative 
associations one has with an attitudinal object or concept at issue. Thus, one could be said 
to have positive implicit attitudes toward independence if the person has more positive 
(rather than negative) associations with independence. These associations need not 
conscious and, yet, have been shown to influence various behaviors in many different 
domains including racial prejudice (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and 
attitudes toward smoking (Andrews, Hampson, Greenwald, Gordon, & Widdop, 2010) or 
HIV (Neumann, Hulsenbeck, & Seibt, 2004). Given the increasing volume of research on 
implicit attitudes in many other domains of research (Greenwald et al., 2002), we believe 
that it is a major oversight on the part of cultural psychologists that the afore-mentioned 
cultural difference in independence and interdependence has never been tested with an 
implicit attitude measure such as implicit association test (IAT). The primary aim of the 
current work was to fill this gap in empirical knowledge. 
Cultural Task Analysis 
 In theorizing on cultural variation in independence and interdependence, 
Kitayama and colleagues (Kitayama & Imada, 2010; Kitayama et al., 2009) have 
hypothesized that cultures provide various means to achieve their cultural mandates. 
European American cultures, for example, offer a number of behavioral routines, 
conventions, scripts, or tasks (e.g., self-expression, leaving home, financial autonomy) 
that help one to achieve independence of the self. These behavioral routines are called 
cultural tasks. Each individual member will necessarily use some of these cultural tasks 
to realize the culture’s mandate of independence. Some people may proactively choose 






social identity, whereas some others may be more passive, merely performing what they 
are required to do to be a good member of their culture. Regardless of their level of 
involvement or volitional choice they exercise, however, individuals are likely to adopt 
only a subset of tasks that are available in their culture, not only because it is impossible 
to seriously perform all of them, but also because any one of the tasks is likely to be 
sufficient to meet the culture’s requirement to be independent.  
Some cultural tasks of independence may require individuals to hold on to a belief 
of the self as internally motivated. Such a belief may give rise to a dispositional cognitive 
bias in attribution (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Na & Kitayama, 2011). Other 
cultural tasks may necessitate focused, task-oriented attention (Kitayama et al., 2003; 
Masuda & Nisbett, 2001) and, yet, others may lead individuals to emphasize personal (vs. 
social) forms of happiness (Oishi & Diener, 2001; Uchida & Kitayama, 2009). The exact 
nature or form of independence any one particular person might acquire is likely to vary 
depending on which tasks are available in the person’s environment as well as which of 
the available ones he or she adopts as his or her own means for achieving the cultural 
mandate of independence. However, as a cultural group, European Americans may be 
expected to be strongly independent.  
 Likewise, Asian cultures provide a number of cultural tasks, behavioral routines 
or scripts that help one to achieve interdependence (e.g., filial piety, social harmony, 
financial interdependence). Any one individual performs a subset of these tasks to realize 
the culture’s mandate of the self as interdependent. Some cultural tasks may require the 
individual to be highly sensitive to contextual or relational cues (Ishii, Reyes, & 






& Kitayama, 2009). As is true in the independent culture, the exact nature of the 
interdependence individuals eventually acquire may depend on the specific tasks they 
adopt among those that are available in their environments, either actively or passively, to 
realize the cultural mandate of interdependence. However, as a cultural group, Asians 
may be expected to be strongly interdependent. 
Available Evidence 
 Individuals engage in their selected cultural tasks during socialization, which 
begins at an early age and continues throughout their lives. This repeated engagement in 
specific cultural tasks is likely to shape individuals’ psychological habits or spontaneous 
tendencies (i.e., how they spontaneously feel, think, and act) in a way that is congruent 
with the cultural norm of independence or interdependence. The resulting independent or 
interdependent psychological tendencies will become habitual (Wood & Neal, 2007), or 
even automatic (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). We call these tendencies implicit because they 
stem from behavioral propensities that are consistent with a model of the self as 
independent (vs. interdependent) and, yet, they are not always linked to the self in any 
explicitly recognized or acknowledged fashion. In other words, these tendencies are 
likely to be detached from the ideas of independence or interdependence at the level of 
conscious reflection (Kitayama, 2002).  
As a first systematic test of cultural task analysis, Kitayama et al. (2009) 
examined five implicit psychological tendencies of independence (vs. interdependence), 
namely, dispositional bias in causal attribution, focused (vs. holistic) attention, salience 
of disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions, form of happiness as personal (vs. social), and 






substantially more independent than Japanese. The researchers also included the Singelis 
(1994) scale of independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal. This measure is said to be 
explicit because it is based on one’s conscious evaluation of his or her ideas of 
independence and interdependence. Curiously, the Singelis measure did not show any 
predicted cultural difference. If anything, it indicated that European Americans were 
more interdependent than Japanese – a pattern that is consistent with a meta-analysis by 
Oyserman and colleagues (2002). 
Present Work 
 Although the Kitayama et al. (2009) study is important in demonstrating 
systematic cultural variation in various implicit (but not explicit) measures, there is one 
limitation. It did not include a task that assesses one’s implicit endorsement of 
independence and interdependence. Given the Kitayama et al. (2009) study, it would 
seem reasonable to hypothesize that as compared to Asians, European Americans 
implicitly value independence more and value interdependence less. Moreover, this may 
be true even when explicit value endorsement shows otherwise (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). The primary goal of the present work, then, was to address this question by 
developing an implicit association test (IAT) of independence vs. interdependence. The 
IAT is the most commonly used implicit measures of individual attitudes.  
A subsidiary goal of the current work was to test additional measures of both 
implicit and explicit independence (vs. interdependence) in an attempt to replicate the 
Kitayama et al. (2009) study. This study showed that Americans were more independent 
(or less interdependent) than Japanese primarily in implicit measures. They also found no 






interdependence). More recently, Na and colleagues (2010) tested an age-heterogeneous 
group of European Americans and similarly found that there is no coherence among 
implicit measures of independence and interdependence; but this study did not include 
non-European American data. Given the fact that the Kitayama et al. (2009) study is the 
only one available that tested several indicators of independence or interdependence 
simultaneously within a cross-cultural design, the lack of coherence among implicit 
independence vs. interdependence in the presence of systematic cross-cultural differences 
needs to be replicated. 
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-seven European American (41 women; Mage= 19.25, SDage= 1.15) and sixty 
Japanese (25 women; Mage= 19.25, SDage= 1.04) college students participated in the study. 
American participants received $7 and Japanese participants received 700 yen in 
exchange for their participation.  
Materials 
 We used six tasks to measure independence (vs. interdependence). Four were 
measures of implicit independence: 1) Implicit association test (IAT), 2) Self-description 
task, 3) Salience of disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions, and 4) Form of happiness as 
personal (vs. social). The remaining two tasks were measures of explicit beliefs about 
independence: 5) Self-construal scale and 6) Semantic differential scale. All materials 
were originally created in English, and translated into Japanese by one of the authors, 
who was bilingual in Japanese and English. To ensure semantic equivalence, back-







Implicit association test. We assessed implicit evaluative associations for 
independence (vs. interdependence) by modifying the standard IAT paradigm 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). We examined the implicit associative strength between target 
words implying the personal vs. relational self and positive vs. negative valence. The IAT 
involved simultaneous sorting of stimulus items, representing two target concepts 
(personal verb and relational verb) and two attributes (positive adjective and negative 
adjective). Participants were presented with the stimulus words one at a time on a 
computer screen and asked to categorize them by pressing one of two response keys as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  
We used a standard seven-block procedure (Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). (1) Participants started by discriminating adjectives by pressing 
the left key for positive adjectives (good, beautiful, clean, healthy, wise) and the right key 
for negative adjectives (bad, ugly, dirty, sick, foolish). (2) Next, participants categorized 
the target concepts by pressing the left key for personal verbs (run, read, stand, turn, wear) 
and the right key for relational verbs (meet, join, ask, visit, help). (3) The third block was 
a practice block of the first combined categorization task (the personal + positive block), 
during which participants were asked to press the left key for both personal verbs and 
positive adjectives, and the right key for both relational verbs and negative adjectives. (4) 
The fourth block consisted of critical trials of Block 3 (the personal + positive block). (5) 
Participants then categorized the target concepts again, but with the response keys 
reversed from Block 2 assignments. (6) The sixth block was a practice block of the 






participants classified relational verbs and positive adjectives on the left key and personal 
verbs and negative adjectives on the right key. (7) The final block consisted of critical 
trials of Block 6 (the relational + positive block). The order in which participants 
performed Blocks 3-4 and 6-7 was counterbalanced (see Condition 2, Table 2.1). Each 
practice block consisted of 20 trials and each critical block consisted of 40 trials. Implicit 
attitude was defined as the mean difference in response latency between the two critical 
blocks (Block 4: personal + positive, and Block 7: relational + positive).  
We predicted that independently oriented Americans would be better at 
associating personal verbs with positive adjectives, resulting in shorter response time in 
the personal + positive block (Block 4) than in the relational + positive block (Block 7). 
This effect was expected to be weaker or even reversed among interdependently oriented 
Japanese.  
 Self-description task. When people describe themselves by completing sentences 
starting with “I am…” (Twenty Statement Test; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), European 
Americans are more likely to list personal attributes and traits (e.g., I am extroverted), 
while Asians are more likely to refer to social roles and relational identities (e.g., I am a 
student at the University of Michigan) (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Cousins, 1989). We 
examined the relative proportion of personal identities compared to social identities listed 
by participants as an implicit indicator of independence (vs. interdependence). In a 
shortened version of the self-description task, participants were asked to complete five 
sentences describing themselves. Two raters in each culture classified the descriptions as 
either 1) personal identities, or 2) social identities. The inter-rater reliability was high 






 Salience of disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions. The implicit social orientation 
questionnaire (ISOQ; Kitayama & Park, 2007) was used to assess the relative salience of 
experiencing socially disengaging emotions versus socially engaging emotions in daily 
life. Participants were asked to recall 10 mundane social situations (e.g., waiting to be 
seated at a restaurant) and report how strongly (1 = not at all, 6 = very strongly) they 
experienced each of 10 different emotions that varied in social engagement (disengaging 
vs. engaging) and valence (positive vs. negative). In previous studies (Kitayama et al., 
2006, 2009), European Americans experienced disengaging emotions (self-esteem, proud, 
frustration, anger) more strongly than engaging emotions (close feelings, friendly feelings, 
shame, guilt). However, the pattern was completely reversed for Japanese. We thus used 
the relative intensity in experiencing disengaging versus engaging emotions as an index 
of implicit independence. The index was computed by averaging the intensity ratings 
across 10 situations for disengaging emotions and engaging emotions separately.  
Form of happiness as personal (vs. social). We also used the ISOQ to assess 
whether happiness was correlated more strongly with disengaging or engaging positive 
emotions for each individual. Previous studies show that Americans’ happiness is better 
predicted by the relative experience of disengaging vs. engaging positive emotions, 
whereas Japanese’s happiness is better predicted by the experience of engaging vs. 
disengaging positive emotions (Kitayama et al., 2006, 2009). To assess the extent to 
which disengaging vs. engaging positive emotions predict happiness, we computed the 
mean rating scores for happiness, disengaging positive emotion, and engaging positive 
emotion for each participant separately for each situation. Then, we regressed the 






positive emotions (i.e., disengaging positive – engaging positive) for each participant. 
The standardized regression coefficient was our measure of implicit independence. A 
higher number indicates that one’s happiness is better predicted by the experience of 
disengaging relative to that of engaging positive emotions.  
Explicit Measures 
 Self-construal scale. As a first explicit measure of independence and 
interdependence, participants filled out a 20-item self-construal scale. This scale was 
composed of selected items from both Singelis (1994) and Takata (1999) scales. Our 
intent was to assess different aspects of independence and interdependence that are 
covered in the two different, although conceptually related scales. The new scale has 10 
independence items (5 from Singelis’s scale and 5 from Takata’s scale) and 10 
interdependence items (4 from Singelis’s scale and 6 from Takata’s scale). Participants 
rated the extent to which they agreed to each item (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree), which yielded separate scores for independent self-construal (αs = .79 and .71, for 
European Americans and for Asians, respectively) and interdependent self-construal (αs 
= .67 and .65).  
Semantic differential scale. Participants’ explicit attitudes towards social 
relationships were assessed with the semantic differential scale. Participants read five 
target words about social relationships (human relationship, social interaction, human 
bond, communication, social activities), and rated their attitudes on a 7-point scale 
between two bipolar adjectives (e.g., from -3: bad to +3: good). Seven bipolar pairs of 
adjectives were used as rating domains (bad – good, weak – strong, passive – active, 






Separately for each target word, we summed the adjective ratings across 7 rating domains. 
These scores were then averaged across the five target words (αs = .88 and .75, for 
European Americans and for Asians, respectively). 
Results 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
 We predicted that Americans would show more favorable implicit attitudes 
toward target words implying the personal self (vs. relational self) than Japanese. 
Following Greenwald et al. (1998), we only included correct response trials, and 
excluded trials of which response time was shorter than 300ms from the analysis. One 
participant’s data was lost due to a program malfunction. Additionally, we excluded 
seven outliers whose response time exceeded 3 standard deviations from the mean, which 
left 109 participants (54 Americans and 55 Japanese) with analyzable data. RTs from the 
two IAT blocks were submitted to a 2 Culture (Americans vs. Japanese) x 2 Block 
(personal + positive block vs. relational + positive block) x 2 Order (personal + positive 
block first vs. relational + positive block first) ANOVA with culture and order as 
between-subjects factors and block as a within-subjects factor. As predicted, the 
interaction between culture and block was statistically significant, F(1, 105) = 3.85, p 
= .05, ηp2 = .04. Americans were significantly faster in the personal + positive block than 
in the relational + positive block (871.16ms vs. 995.96ms), F(1, 53) = 7.59, p < .01, ηp2 
= .13, thereby showing that they have stronger evaluative associations between the 
personal self and positive words than associations between the relational self and positive 






816.77ms), F(1, 54) = 2.32, p > .13. The block order did not significantly interact with 
this effect, F < 1, ns.  
Other Implicit Tendencies  
 We further examined additional measures of implicit independence to see whether 
Americans were indeed more independent (or less interdependent) than Japanese as in the 
Kitayama et al. (2009) study. The findings from the four implicit indicators of 
independence including the IAT are summarized in Table 2.2.  
 Self-description task. The proportion of descriptions in each category (personal 
identities vs. social identities) was submitted to a 2 Culture x 2 Category mixed ANOVA 
with culture as a between-subjects factor and category as a within-subjects factor. The 
Culture x Category interaction was significant, F(1, 115) = 10.91, p < .005, ηp2 = .08. As 
expected, Americans listed more descriptions pertaining to personal identities than 
Japanese (.74 vs. .60), F(1, 115) = 10.27, p < .005, ηp2 = .08, while Japanese referred to 
social identities more than Americans (.40 vs. .25), F(1, 115) = 11.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .09.  
Salience of disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions. To examine cultural difference 
in the relative experience of disengaging versus engaging emotions, we performed a 2 
Culture (Americans vs. Japanese) x 2 Emotion type (disengaging vs. engaging) ANOVA 
with culture as a between-subjects factor and emotion type as a within-subjects factor. 
Main effects of both culture and emotion type were significant, F(1, 115) = 4.69, p < .05, 
hp2 = .04, and F(1, 115) = 19.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. These main effects were qualified by 
the expected 2-way interaction, F(1, 115) = 13.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Americans 






F(1, 56) = 26.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, while Japanese experienced both emotion types 
equally (2.12 vs. 2.09), F(1, 59) < 1, ns.  
Form of happiness as personal (vs. social). We then examined the relative 
extent to which disengaging versus engaging positive emotions predicted happiness. We 
subtracted the mean intensity score for engaging positive emotions from the 
corresponding score for disengaging positive emotions to make a relative strength index. 
Happiness was regressed on this relative strength index (i.e., disengaging positive – 
engaging positive), and the regression coefficient was compared across two cultural 
groups. The standardized coefficient was significantly greater for Americans than for 
Japanese (-.33 vs. -.48), F(1, 115) = 4.24, p < .05, ηp2 = .04. This suggests that the extent 
to which disengaging (vs. engaging) positive emotions predict happiness was 
significantly greater for Americans than for Japanese.  
Explicit Measures 
The results so far suggest that Americans were indeed more independent (or less 
interdependent) than Japanese in all implicit measures. We further tested explicit 
indicators. The means and standard errors of two explicit measures are summarized in 
Table 2.3.   
Self-construal scale. Consistent with what we observed in implicit measures, 
Americans were more independent than Japanese (3.78 vs. 3.18), F(1, 115) = 26.31, p 
< .005, ηp2 = .19. The two cultural groups, however, did not differ in their 
interdependence although there was a slight trend toward Japanese being more 






Semantic differential scale. One participant did not fill out the questionnaire, 
and therefore was not included in the analysis. Counter to what would be expected, 
Americans exhibited more favorable explicit attitudes toward relationships than Japanese 
did (11.87 vs. 6.77), F(1, 114) = 30.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .21.  
Correlations Among the Implicit Measures 
The findings so far suggest that implicit tendencies clearly differentiate the two 
cultural groups, while explicit indicators do not. Americans were indeed more 
independent (or less interdependent) than Japanese when their implicit tendencies were 
examined. However, cultural difference was either non-significant (as in the 
interdependent self-construal scale) or was the opposite of what would be expected (as in 
the semantic differential scale) when explicit indicators of independence were examined.  
Next, we examined correlations among the four implicit indicators within each 
culture. We converted data so that positive scores signified greater independence. 
Specifically, this includes 1) IAT score (the relational + positive block RT – the personal 
+ positive block RT), 2) the proportion of personal (vs. social) identity descriptions in the 
self-description test, 3) the experience of disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions, 4) 
personal (vs. social) happiness. As can be seen in Table 4, the correlations among the 
measures are close to zero. The mean correlation across the four measures was negligible 
both for Americans (r = .07) and for Japanese (r = .09). Out of twelve possible 
correlations, only one was statistically significant. However, even this significant 







 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been utilized extensively as a primary 
means to assess implicit cognitions (Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald et al., 2009); 
however, the present study is the first attempt to employ it in cross-cultural research on 
independence and interdependence. As predicted, we found that Americans hold more 
favorable implicit attitudes toward independence (vs. interdependence) relative to 
Japanese. Furthermore, we also found that Americans were relatively more independent 
(vs. interdependent) than Japanese on three additional implicit measures, thus providing 
converging evidence for the claim that Americans are more independent and/or less 
interdependent than Japanese when implicit measures are employed (Kitayama et al., 
2009).  
 In contrast to the implicit measures, the results from two explicit measures of 
independence and interdependence were inconsistent. First, in the independent vs. 
interdependent self-construal scale, Americans were more independent than Japanese, 
whereas the pattern was reversed for interdependence but only non-significantly. 
Although the pattern is consistent with the notion that Japanese are relatively more 
interdependent or less independent than Americans, a similar pattern is not always 
observed (Kitayama et al., 2009; Oyserman et al., 2002). Moreover, in the present study, 
explicit measures of relational orientation assessed with the semantic differential scale 
showed a stronger relational tendency for Americans than for Japanese. It is all the more 
noteworthy that the implicit measures of independence and interdependence show a 
highly systematic cross-cultural variation.  
It is possible that explicit cultural norms can change rapidly in accordance with 






tendencies are likely to depend more on tacit cultural practices, conventions, and 
associated meanings and, as a consequence, they may not show such a rapid change. In 
the post-World War II Japan, highly individualistic norms were brought in from the 
West, which might have caused substantial changes in explicit norms. Yet, at tacit, 
implicit levels, a more traditional, community-oriented, interdependent mode of being 
might have been largely preserved (Toivonen, Norasakkunkit, & Uchida, 2011).  
Importantly, as in the Kitayama et al. (2009) and Na et al. (2010) studies, we 
found little coherence among implicit measures of independence (vs. interdependence). 
This was the case despite the fact that these measures systematically differentiated the 
two cultural groups. This lack of coherence among the measures that make up 
independence or interdependence is consistent with the cultural task analysis. This 
theoretical framework suggests that individuals use only a (supposedly rather small) 
subset of available cultural tasks to achieve the mandates of their cultures such as 
independence and interdependence. Further, we assume that individuals are likely to 
differ substantially in the specific cultural tasks they adopt to attain that mandate. 
Because the specific psychological tendencies they eventually acquire will depend upon 
the specific set of tasks they adopt to achieve their cultural mandate, it would follow that 
even though cultural groups are different systematically across all aspects of 
psychological tendencies associated with independence or interdependence, exactly 
which tendencies are acquired by any given individual will, in effect, be rather random 
and thus unpredictable without knowing more specific ways in which each individual has 






very unlikely to cohere within each culture even though they differentiate different 
cultures in a systematic fashion.  
To illustrate this point, we created profiles of independence (vs. interdependence) 
for our study participants. First, we created profiles for each cultural group on the basis of 
the overall group mean of independence vs. interdependence (see Figure 2.1-A for 
American group and Figure 2.1-B for Japanese group). The four poles stemming from the 
center of the diagram represent the four implicit tasks we used. All the task scores were 
first standardized and then marked on a 3-point scale on each pole (-1.5: highly 
interdependent, +1.5: highly independent). The bold line in each figure reflects 
participants’ scores across the four tasks. As the figures illustrate, the area covered by the 
bold line is much larger for Americans than for Japanese, suggesting that Americans are 
more independent than Japanese. Next, we created individual profiles of our study 
participants based on each participant’s scores across the four tasks. Figures 2.1-C and 
2.1-E are the sample profiles of two American participants, and Figures 2.1-D and 2.1-F 
are the sample profiles of two Japanese participants. Although the mean levels of 
independence were almost the same for the two Americans (0.47 for C and 0.48 for E), 
they produced very different individual profiles. C’s independence is most pronounced in 
the index of personal (vs. social) happiness, whereas E’s independence is largest in the 
self-description task. A similar difference in profiles is found between the two Japanese. 
This exercise illustrates that an individual profile of independence (vs. interdependence), 
which is expected to vary across individuals but to be stable across time, can serve as a 
meaningful signature of an individual’s cultural orientation (see Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 






We are aware that the current analysis would go against a central premise of 
classical psychometrics, which holds that internal consistency as indicated by statistical 
coherence (e.g., reliability) is a key feature of any meaningful construct. This issue is 
beyond the scope of the current investigation. However, it is important to note that this 
central premise in psychometrics could be challenged at least under certain circumstances 
in which defining features of a construct vary from one individual to the next depending 
on a variety of contextual factors. A path-breaking effort addressing this possibility is 
currently underway in psychometrics (Nesselroade, Gerstorf, Hardy, & Ram, 2007; 
Nesselroade & Molenaar, 2010). This emerging literature could greatly inform future 
work on culture and cultural variation in psychological processes, insofar as the cultural 
task analysis suggests that defining features of independence or interdependence should 
vary from one person to the next, reflecting each person’s idiosyncratic mode of cultural 
adaptation. 
The cultural task analysis suggests that active engagement in selected cultural 
tasks makes psychological tendencies habitual and implicit; in turn, this may influence 
underlying brain mechanisms (Schwartz & Begley, 2003). It would be of great interest to 
determine whether the current findings could be extended to neural indicators of implicit 
tendencies in general (Kitayama & Park, 2010) and the brain pathways involved in 
implicit attitudes (e.g., Chee, Sriram, Soon, & Lee, 2000). Further effort along this line 
will provide an important basis for the emerging field of cultural neuroscience (Kitayama 
















































Condition 1 Left Key Right Key
Block 1 (practice) Positive adjectives Negaitve adjectives
Block 2 (practice) Personal verbs Relational verbs
Block 3 (practice) Personal + Positive Relational + Negative
Block 4 (critical) Personal + Positive Relational + Negative
Block 5 (practice) Relational verbs Personal verbs
Block 6 (practice) Relational + Positive Personal + Negative
Block 7 (critical) Relational + Positive Personal + Negative
Condition 2 Left Key Right Key
Block 1 (practice) Positive adjectives Negaitve adjectives
Block 2 (practice) Relational verbs Personal verbs
Block 3 (practice) Relational + Positive Personal + Negative
Block 4 (critical) Relational + Positive Personal + Negative
Block 5 (practice) Personal verbs Relational verbs
Block 6 (practice) Personal + Positive Relational + Negative






Table 2.2 Means and standard errors for the four implicit tasks in Study 1 
 
 

















Tasks Implicit indicators M SE M SE
Implicit association test Personal + positive block RT 871.16 23.72 771.74 23.51
Relational + positive block RT 995.96 29.40 816.77 29.13
Self-description task Personal identities 0.74 0.03 0.60 0.03
Social identities 0.25 0.03 0.40 0.03
Salience of disengaging (vs. engaging) emotions Experience of disengaging emotions 2.45 0.08 2.12 0.07
Experience of engaging emotions 2.12 0.06 2.09 0.05







Table 2.3 Means and standard errors for the four explicit tasks in Study 1 
 
 
Tasks Explicit indicators M SE M SE
Self-construal scale Independence 3.78 0.09 3.18 0.08
Interdependence 3.45 0.07 3.60 0.07







Table 2.4 Correlations among the four implicit measures (IAT score, personal vs. social 
self-descriptions, salience of disengaging vs. engaging emotions, and form of happiness 
as personal vs. social) of independence and interdependence for Americans (top) and for 
Japanese (down) in Study 1 
 
Note. 57 Americans except for the IAT score (N = 54), and 60 Japanese except for the 
IAT score (N = 55). On all measures, higher numbers represent a stronger orientation 
toward independence vs. interdependence. For example, the IAT score was computed by 
subtracting the RT for the personal + positive block from that for the relational + positive 
block. The higher number indicates a strong preference for the personal self over the 
relational self.  

























1. IAT score 0.22 0.05 -0.01 !"!#
2. Personal vs. social self-descriptions -0.11 0.19
3. Salience of disengaging vs. enginag emotions 0.11
4. Form of happines as personal vs. social
1. IAT score -0.02 0.30 * -0.10 !"!$
2. Personal vs. social self-descriptions 0.16 0.17
3. Salience of disengaging vs. enginag emotions 0.05
4. Form of happines as personal vs. social
Americans
Japanese
Correlations among the four mplicit measur s (IAT sco e, personal vs. social self-descripti ns,
salience of disengaging vs. engaging emotions, and form of happiness as personal vs. social) of 
Independence and Interdependence for Americans (top) and for Japanese (down)
*p ! .05.
Note. 57 Americans except for the IAT score (N = 54), and 60 Japanese except for the IAT score (N = 
55). On all measures, higher numbers represent a stronger orientation toward independence vs. 
interdependence. For example, the IAT score was computed by subtracting the RT for the personal + 
positive block from that for the relational + positive block. The higher number indicates a strong 
preference for the personal self over th  relational self. 
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Figure 2.1 Profiles of independence (vs. interdependence) for American group (A) and 
Japanese group (B) in Study 1. Figures C and E are individual profiles for two American 












Culture and Emotion 
 
Chapter III addresses two research questions to extend the current literature on 
culture and emotion. Study 2 examined whether the linkage between anger expression 
and social status is moderated by culture, depending on the extent to which a specific 
function of anger (anger as vented frustration or anger as dominance display) is 
emphasized in each culture. Study 3 examined the linkage between perceived social 
support and health, with an emphasis on several moderating factors, including culture, 
situational context, and personality, which are hypothesized to highlight or conceal 
emotional costs associated with receiving support. The predictions in both Study 2 and 
Study 3 were tested in a large-scale cross-cultural survey of American and Japanese 
adults.  
Study 2: Two Faces of Anger: 
Culture Moderates the Linkage Between Social Status and Anger Expression 
 People sometimes become angry when they are frustrated. By expressing anger, 
they vent their frustration (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989). Some other times, however, people 
become angry when their social status is threatened. By expressing anger, they display 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Study 2 is co-authored with Shinobu Kitayama. Study 3 is co-authored with Shinobu Kitayama, Mayumi 
Karasawa, Katherine Curhan, Hazel R. Markus, Norito Kawakami, Yuri Miyamoto, Gayle D. Love, 






their dominance and power (Goffman, 1967). These two aspects of anger have so far 
been discussed in separate literatures. However, insofar as both of them are likely to be 
integral parts of this emotion, they may have to be taken into account together to fully 
understand how anger functions in different socio-cultural contexts.  
In the present work, we will explore the possibility that the two aspects of anger 
expression are more or less salient depending on culture. Specifically, we suggest that the 
function of anger as vented frustration is relatively more salient in independent cultures, 
where pursuit of personal goals is primary and self-defining and, as a consequence, a 
blockage of these goals is likely to entail important negative emotional consequences 
including anger expression. In contrast, the function of anger as dominance display is 
likely to be relatively more salient in interdependent cultures, where a sense of belonging 
to an ingroup and the relative ranking in it are primary and self-defining and, as a 
consequence, maintenance of one’s position within the ingroup hierarchy entails 
important emotional consequences. We used large-scale matched surveys that were 
recently conducted in the U.S. (an independent culture) and Japan (an interdependent 
culture) and tested the hypothesis that Americans tend to vent their frustration by 
expressing anger, while Japanese tend to display and protect their dominance and power 
by doing so.  
Two Faces of Anger: Venting Frustration and Dominance Display 
 There is a broad consensus that one prominent function of anger expression is to 
vent frustration. Frustration is a commonly observed emotional response following a 
blockage of goal attainment (Harmon-Jones, Peterson, & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Mikula, 






frustration that is experienced will increase the readiness toward anger expression and 
aggression (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Spector, 1975). Since the 
pioneering work of Dollard et al. (1939), the link between frustration and anger 
expression has been supported by numerous studies. Although some modifications have 
since been proposed (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989, 1993; Dill & Anderson, 1995), the basic 
thesis that frustration plays an integral role in eliciting anger remains widely accepted. 
 One unique piece of evidence for the frustration-aggression hypothesis comes 
from population differences in anger propensities. If anger were expressed to vent 
frustration, individuals in lower social status would display it more, insofar as they would 
find it harder to fulfill their goals and desires, thereby experiencing frustration more. In 
support of this analysis, previous studies showed that people with lower socioeconomic 
positions are more likely to show aggressive and delinquent behaviors (Brownfield, 1986; 
Elliot & Ageton, 1980), express hostility more often (Barefoot et al., 1991), and commit 
violent crimes such as homicide more compared to their higher-class counterparts (Blau 
& Blau, 1982; Crutchfield, 1989; Parker, 1989). Although violence differs from anger in 
many aspects and, in fact, some forms of violence do not necessarily implicate anger 
(Averill, 1982), this evidence is suggestive of the possibility that anger expression might 
be more prevalent among those with lower social status (Henry, 2009). 
Another notable line of work on anger focuses on lay knowledge associated with 
this emotion. Researchers have pointed out that anger and dominance are closely linked 
in beliefs lay people have about this emotion (Averill, 1982; Goffman, 1967; Hess, 
Blairy, & Kleck, 2000). When semantic associations of anger are tested, it often comes 






compassion, shyness, and sympathy (e.g., Conway, DiFazio, & Mayman, 1999; Tiedens, 
Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Similarly, appraisal theories of emotion posit that power 
potential is a crucial element of anger (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1999). Moreover, 
facial expressions of anger are perceived as signaling dominance (Hareli, Shomrat, & 
Hess, 2009; Hess et al., 2000; Knutson, 1996; Tiedens et al., 2000). As may also be 
expected, people sometimes use anger as an intimidation strategy (Clark, Pataki, & 
Carver, 1996; Jones & Pittman, 1982). This body of work suggests that anger sometimes 
functions as a marker of dominance, power, and high social ranking or status. Indeed, 
social perceivers judge another person’s anger as more legitimate if this person is 
powerful and is high in status (LaFrance & Hecht, 1999; Maybury, 1997; Shields, 2000).  
If anger were expressed to display dominance, power and high ranking, it might 
be anticipated that anger expression would increase as a function of social status. The 
aforementioned evidence linking anger expression to lower social status (which provided 
support for the frustration-aggression hypothesis) appears to contradict this prediction. 
However, the observations on the negative link between anger expression and social 
status come nearly entirely from Western societies and cultures. Thus, it remains possible 
that the linkage between social status and anger expression might be reversed in other 
cultures. Such a reversal might be anticipated if the dominance display function of anger 
were culturally elaborated more than its function of venting frustration.  
Culture and Anger Expression 
 In the present paper, we argue that the relative prominence or salience of the two 
disparate functions of anger expression varies across cultures. We assume that both of 






At the same time, however, we also suggest that depending on the overarching model of 
the self as independent or interdependent that is sanctioned in a given cultural context, 
one or the other aspect of anger expression is more salient. If anger is expressed primarily 
to vent frustration, then anger will be expressed more by those with lower social status; 
but if anger is expressed primarily to express dominance and power, then it will be 
expressed more by those with higher social status.  
It has been proposed that cultures vary in the nature of the self that is sanctioned 
(Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). In Western cultures, 
including U.S. society, independence of the self is highly sanctioned. Individuals in these 
cultures therefore show a strong commitment to their personal goals. Achieving one’s 
personal goals is held to be highly self-defining and central to what is meant as a person 
in these cultures, insofar as it is the cornerstone of culturally scripted tasks of 
independence (Kitayama et al., 2009). For example, Uchida and Kitayama (2009) find 
that among European Americans, there is a close perceived link between personal 
achievement and general hedonic experiences such as joy, excitement, relaxation, and 
positive forward-looking attitudes. Relatively speaking, one’s embeddedness in social 
groups and his or her standing in these groups are less important in defining the self. It 
would follow, then, that within the U.S. cultural context, anger expression is much more 
likely to function as a means for venting one’s frustration rather than for displaying one’s 
dominance, power, or social status.  
In contrast, East Asian cultures place a greater premium on social relations and 
interdependence of the self with others. Individuals in these cultures therefore show a 






group or relationship is highly self-defining and central to the very definition of 
personhood in these cultures, insofar as it is the key element of culturally scripted tasks of 
interdependence (Kitayama et al., 2009). In the aforementioned work, Uchida and 
Kitayama (2009) find that unlike Americans, Japanese perceive a close link between 
social harmony or social embeddedness and general hedonic experiences of joy, forward-
looking attitudes, and the like. To the extent that hierarchy is an inherent part of any 
given group – especially in cultures, like Japan, that are considered to be high in the value 
placed on societal hierarchy (Hofstede, 1980), one’s place or relative status in the 
reference group is likely to be highly self-defining. Relatively speaking, personal 
achievement and, thus by extension, one’s personal goals are less important in defining 
the self. It would then follow that in Japanese cultural context, anger expression is much 
more likely to function as a means for displaying one’s dominance and social status 
rather than for venting his or her frustration.  
Present Study 
In the present work, we tested the degree to which the linkage between anger 
expression and social status might be moderated by culture. In independent cultural 
contexts such as the U.S., one’s personal goals and desires are seen as self-defining and, 
as a consequence, the aspect of anger as vented frustration is likely to be highly salient. 
We therefore anticipated that among Americans, there would be a negative relationship 
between social status and anger expression, such that anger would be expressed more 
frequently among those with low (vs. high) social status. In contrast, in interdependent 
cultural contexts such as Japan, one’s sense of belonging to a group or relationship in 






consequence, the aspect of anger as dominance display may play a much more prominent 
role. We thus hypothesized that among Japanese, there would be a positive relationship 
between social status and anger expression, such that anger would be expressed more 
frequently among those with high (vs. low) social status. 
 In testing our predictions, we followed previous work (e.g., Ritsher, Warner, 
Johnson, & Dohrenwend, 2001) and used both educational attainment and occupational 
prestige to yield an indicator of social status. Social class markers such as educational 
attainment and job prestige may be considered objective in the sense that they are 
consensual and socially verifiable. While these objective social status markers are quite 
significant in predicting a variety of outcome variables including health, mortality and 
wellbeing, recent work suggests that above and beyond one’s objective social standing, a 
subjective assessment of the self’s relative rank within his or her own community has 
additional effects (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Demakakos, Nazroo, Breeze, & Marmot, 2008). The subjective social status is typically 
assessed by asking participants to indicate their standing in their own community by 
checking a location on a vertical ladder that signifies varying ranks (Goodman et al., 
2001). 
If anger is expressed to vent frustration, it will be responsive primarily to one’s 
feeling of frustration, which is likely to be linked more to one’s subjective assessment of 
how well or poor-off he or she is in one’s community. We therefore anticipated that the 
negative link between social status and anger expression, predicted for Americans, would 
be found primarily for the perceived standing measure of social status. If, however, anger 






agreed-upon markers of social status such as education and occupational prestige – 
markers of social status that are socially consensual and, thus, more objective rather than 
subjective. We therefore anticipated that the positive link between social status and anger 
expression, predicted for Japanese, would be found primarily for the composite social 
class indicator of educational attainment and occupational prestige.  
Method 
Participants 
  American data were obtained from the second wave of the MIDUS (Midlife in the 
U.S.) national study. The respondents were 1,255 adults (aged 34-84) who were 
randomly surveyed via phone, and then agreed to participate in an additional overnight 
hospital assessment session, during which they completed a written survey packet (with a 
71% retention rate). As a companion survey in Japan, residents in the Tokyo metropolitan 
area were randomly contacted to complete the self-administered questionnaire packet, 
which was developed based on the MIDUS survey. The final sample in MIDJA (Midlife 
Health in Japan) consisted of 1,027 adults (aged 30-79), with a response rate of 56.2%. 
Respondents of two cultural groups were matched on age (Americans: M = 54.52, SD = 
11.72 vs. Japanese: M = 54.36, SD = 14.15), gender (female: 57.8 vs. 50.8%), marital 
status (married: 64.6 vs. 69.1%), and mean educational level (two-year of college or 
vocational degree vs. one-year of college).  
Measures 
Objective social status. Socioeconomic status was measured by two indicators: 
education and occupation. Participants’ level of educational attainment (1 = 8th grade, 






occupational status (1 = manual, blue-collar, or service, 3 = managerial or professional) 
were standardized and averaged within culture to yield a single indicator of objective 
social status.  
Subjective social status. Following prior research (e.g., Adler et al., 2000; 
Curhan et al., 2012), participants were presented with a picture of a ladder, which have 
10 rungs (1 = lowest, 10 = highest; Goodman et al., 2001), and asked to choose the rung 
on the ladder on which they feel they stand to indicate their relative standing in their 
“own community.” What this community might be was left open so that each participant 
could choose the one that made best sense for him or herself. 
Anger expression. Spielberger’s anger expression inventory (1986) was used to 
assess the frequency of anger is expressed, suppressed or controlled. This scale is 
composed of three subscales: Anger-out (8 items), Anger-in (8-items) and Anger-control 
(4 items). The anger-out subscale assesses how often (1 = almost never, 4 = almost 
always) people express angry feelings through verbally or physically aggressive 
behaviors when they feel furious and angry (e.g., I slam doors, I say nasty things). The 
anger-in subscale measures the extent to which anger is held in or suppressed (e.g., I 
withdraw from people, I keep things in). Finally, the third component, the anger-control 
subscale measures the extent to which people attempt to control the expression of anger 
(e.g., I control my tempter, I keep my cool). Since our analysis focuses on overt 
expression of anger, the data from the anger-out subscale was used in our primary 
analysis (αs = .77 and .80 for Americans and Japanese, respectively). Descriptive 






Control variables. We controlled for several personality variables that could 
potentially confound the relationship between social status and anger expression. 
Specifically, previous work shows that anger expression is negatively related to 
agreeableness (Marshall, Wortman, Vickers, Kusulas, & Hervig, 1994; Martin & Watson, 
1997) and conscientiousness (Öfke ve Öfke et al., 2012), while positively related to 
extraversion (King & Emmons, 1990; Öfke ve Öfke et al., 2012). Each personality trait 
was assessed by self-ratings of four pertinent personality adjectives: agreeableness (e.g., 
helpful, warm), conscientiousness (e.g., organized, responsible), and extraversion (e.g., 
outgoing, lively). Participants rated how much each of the adjectives describes them (1 = 
not at all, 4 = a lot) (Rossi, 2001; agreeableness, αs = .87 and .82 for Americans and 
Japanese, respectively, conscientiousness αs = .57 and .61, extraversion, αs = .83 and 
.78). 
Results 
 Hierarchical regressions examined whether the relationship between social status 
and anger expression would be moderated by culture. In Step 1, we entered demographic 
variables (age and gender), as well as the control personality variables (agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and extraversion). In Step 2, three variables germane to our 
hypothesis, that is, culture, objective social status, and subjective social status were 
entered. Finally, Step 3 involved two two-way interactions between culture and each of 
the two social status indicators. To address possible multicollinearity, centered scores 
were used to compute interaction terms (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Cronbach, 1987).  






 Consistent with previous cross-cultural research (Matsumoto, Takeuchi, 
Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998; Matsumoto, Yoo, Hirayama, & Petrova, 2005), 
Americans reported more expressed anger than did Japanese participants, b = -.79, 
t(2189) = -5.79, p < .001. There was no gender effect, b = .18, t < 1.26, ns. Consistent 
with prior work (Schieman, 1999; Spielberger, Gerard, & Rosario, 1983), anger 
expression became less frequent as a function of age, b = -.06, t = -10.28, p < .001. In 
addition, consistent with prior work, anger expression was negatively related to 
agreeableness and conscientiousness, b = -.52, t = -3.22, p = .001, and b = -.90, t = -5.82, 
p < .001, respectively, while related positively to extraversion, b = .77, t = 5.38, p < .001. 
Our primary prediction was that anger expression should either increase or 
decrease as a function of social status depending on culture. A negative link between the 
two variables was predicted for Americans. Moreover, this relationship was expected to 
be evident for subjective social status. As predicted, there was a significant negative 
relation between the anger expression and subjective social status among Americans, 
after controlling for all relevant variables, b = -.32, t(2189)1 = -8.68, p < .001. As shown 
in Fig. 3.1-A, this relationship was negligible among Japanese, b < .01, t < 1, ns. The 
interaction between subjective social status and culture, implied by this pattern, 
approached statistical significance, b = .13, t(2189) = 1.81, p = .07. 
 Next, a positive link between social status and anger expression was predicted for 
Japanese. Moreover, this relationship was expected primarily for objective social status 
indexed by a composite of educational attainment and occupational prestige. As 
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Simple slopes for each cultural group were tested in the regression equation which included two two-way 
interaction terms between culture and each of who indices of social status. Mediational analysis, however, 






predicted, the Culture x Objective social status interaction proved significant, b = .32, 
t(2189) = 2.37, p < .05. The relevant patterns are illustrated in Fig. 3.1-B. As predicted, 
among Japanese, anger expression increased as a function of objective social status, b = 
.37, t(2189) = 4.53, p < .001. This effect, however, was completely absent among 
Americans, b = .03, t < 1, ns.  
Is the American Effect Mediated by Frustration? 
 Our analysis indicates that Americans show a significantly positive relationship 
between subjective social status and anger expression, which may be due to the venting 
of frustration through anger expression. That is, lower subjective status would be 
associated with greater frustration, which in turn would result in more expressed anger. 
Although any causal explanation is difficult to confirm with correlational data alone, it is 
at least possible to test whether the other aspects of the data are consistent with this 
interpretation. We thus tested whether the link from subjective social status to anger 
expression was mediated by frustration. We used the rating of frustration participants 
reported to have felt during the past 30 days (1 = none of the time, 4 = all the time).  
We first confirmed that subjective social status was negatively related to both the 
mediator (i.e., frustration), b = -.03, t(1210) = -2.04, p < .05, and the outcome variable 
(i.e., anger expression), b = -.10, t(1210) = -1.76, p < .08. Next, we tested whether the 
effect of subjective social status on anger expression would be attenuated when 
frustration was included in the model as a joint predictor. The path from subjective social 
status to anger expression was no longer significant, b = -.09, t(1209) = -1.60, ns, 
although the effect of frustration on anger expression remained significant, b = .25, 






subjective social status through frustration to anger expression was statistically 
significant (95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence interval = [-.03, -.01]; see Panel 
A of Fig. 3.2). 
Is the Japanese Effect Mediated by Decision Authority? 
 Our analysis also indicated a significantly negative relationship between objective 
social status and anger expression in Japanese participants, because they may manifest 
dominance and power by expressing anger. That is, high objective social status would 
foster the expression of anger to display power and protect status. This possible link from 
objective social status to anger expression was tested in a meditational model. Self-
reported rating of authority in decision-making was used to index power and dominance. 
Participants rated how often (1 = none of the time, 4 = all the time) they feel that they 
have decision authority in their work by completing an 8-item scale (Bosma & Marmot, 
1997; e.g., have a say in decisions about my work; αs = .87 and .88 for Americans and 
Japanese, respectively)2. 
 We first observed, as expected, that objective social status was positively related 
to both decision authority, b = 1.49, t(697) = 5.85, p < .001, and anger expression, b = 
.34, t(697) = 1.97, p < .05. Next, we found that when both objective social status and 
decision authority were entered into a regression as predictors, the relationship between 
objective social status and anger expression became non-significant, b = .22, t(696) = 
1.23, ns. In this analysis, the effect of decision authority on anger expression remained 
significant, b = .08, t(696) = 3.29, p < .01. Confirming this pattern of mediation, the 
bootstrapping test showed that the mediated path from objective social status through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







decision authority to anger expression was statistically significant (95% bias-corrected 
bootstrapping CI = [.04, .24]; see Panel B of Fig. 3.2). 
Discussion 
Anger as Vented Frustration versus Dominance Display 
Concurring with a number of prominent scholars of emotion, Scherer (2001) 
advocated that there are two distinct faces in anger. Whereas anger sometimes expresses 
a person’s frustration, it may also display his or her social status, power, and dominance. 
The most important contribution of the present work was to show that both aspects of 
anger are likely to be real; yet, their salience or significance varies as a function of 
culture.  
In independent cultures such as U.S. society, personal goals and desires are self-
defining and, thus, anger resulting from a blockage of these goals and desires becomes 
more focal. In accordance with this analysis, American adults reported that they 
expressed anger more if they perceived themselves to be lower ranking within their 
communities. Furthermore, the effect of subjective social status on anger expression was 
significantly mediated by the self-report rating of frustration experienced during the past 
30 days.  
In contrast, in interdependent cultures, such as Japan, personal goals and desires 
may be tempered by other factors. Instead, it is one’s sense of one’s belong to a 
significant relationship and his or her place and status in the relationship that are more 
self-defining. Thus, anger resulting from display of dominance, power, and status 
becomes more focal, both collectively elaborated and cognitively salient. In line with this 






were of higher objective social status. Furthermore, consistent with the analysis that 
higher-status Japanese express anger to display and protect their own status, we found 
that the perception of decision authority in their roles significantly mediated the link 
between objective social status and anger expression. 
It is unlikely that when their status is threatened, Japanese are simply frustrated, 
causing them to become angry. First, in interdependent cultural contexts, high social 
status is unlikely to be a personal goal. Rather, it is a socially ascribed aspect of the self, 
signifying social recognition and public appraisal rather than personal accomplishment or 
achievement. Second, consistent with this theoretical argument, Japanese with lower 
objective status were no higher in the frustration rating as compared to their higher status 
counterparts. 
Social Status: Objective and Subjective 
We also highlighted the possibility that how social status operates may vary 
across cultures. We found that lower-status Americans express anger more because of 
their relatively low status, as they themselves perceive it. It appears that American culture 
highlights personal and individual aspects of both anger (i.e., vented frustration) and 
social status (i.e., one’s perceived ranking in their own community). In contrast, we found 
that higher-status Japanese express anger more because of their consensually 
acknowledged status. As much as Americans emphasize more personal aspects of the 
self, emotion, and social status, Japanese appear to take social or consensual aspects of 
both anger (i.e., display of dominance and power) and social status (i.e., consensually 






Consistent with this analysis, Curhan and colleagues (2012) have recently 
observed that wellbeing and perceived health are predicted more strongly by subjective 
social status for Americas, whereas they are predicted more strongly by objective social 
status for Japanese. Moreover, previous evidence indicates that direct appraisal of the self 
(i.e., how I think or feel) is more important for Americans, but reflected appraisal of the 
self (i.e., how others might think or feel) is more important for Asians, with a 
consequence on a variety of social psychological processes (e.g., Cohen, Hoshino-
Browne, & Leung, 2007; Kitayama et al., 2004; Na & Kitayama, 2012). More recent 
work has validated this conclusion with neural evidence (e.g., Ma et al., 2012; Park & 
Kitayama, 2012). For example, Park and Kitayama (2012) have shown that unlike 
Americans of European descent, Asians exhibit an especially intensified neural response 
to an error when the error is perceived as public – that is, when it is committed while the 
participants are incidentally exposed to a watching face.  
Future research should investigate more specific mechanisms – not only 
psychological and neural, but also sociological and demographic –, which substantiate 
the cultural differences in the relative emphasis on subjective vs. objective social status. 
One possibility is that independent societies tend to encourage residential mobility (Oishi, 
2010), which in turn form a variety of internally homogeneous ethnic and social class 
enclaves (Murray, 2012; Putnam, 2000). Given the demographic changes that occurred in 
U.S. society over the last several decades, many people may assess their social status 
primarily by social reference within their own internally homogeneous community. 
Although macroscopic markers of social class, such as educational attainment and 






people into different internally homogenous enclaves, they may lose their power to as 
potently influence psychological processes. It is well documented, however, that 
residential mobility is far more restricted in Japan than in the U.S. Thus, for Japanese, 
objective social status markers retain their influence on the subjective experience as well. 
Emotion Regulation and Culture: Anger Privilege Across Cultures 
Our current findings are consistent with an emerging literature on culture and 
emotion regulation. Recently, several studies have shown that as compared to Americans 
of European family backgrounds, Asians place a greater value on suppression and control 
of emotions (Mauss & Butler, 2010). In fact, Asians reportedly suppress their emotions 
more frequently (Matsumoto, Yoo, Nakagawa, & Rules, 2008). Moreover, Asians appear 
to down-regulate their negative emotions more effectively when asked to do so. This is 
the case in both self-report (Mauss & Butler, 2010) and a neural indicator of emotional 
processing (Murata, Moser, & Kitayama, in press).  
Because emotional experience is a prima-facie element of subjective experience, 
this set of findings would imply that Americans would be very likely to express what 
they have in mind. This is exactly what we observed with respect to anger expression. 
Americans expressed anger more, especially when they are frustrated. Japanese, however, 
were rather different in this regard. In line with the evidence that Japanese tend to down-
regulate their emotions quite well, they reportedly expressed anger much less than 
Americans did. It was only when their objective social status was sufficiently high that 
they expressed anger as much as the typical Americans did (Fig. 3.1-B). We may 
interpret this pattern to suggest that Japanese, especially those with lower objective social 






to express their anger, might they release this regulatory effort. In other words, within the 
Japanese cultural context, high objective social status might function as a cultural permit 
or authorization to experience and express anger.  
Although social norms about emotion expression do exist even in highly 
individualistic societies like the U.S. (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1969), the 
nature of the rule itself might vary across cultures. One sensible working hypothesis 
would be that display rules tend to be prohibitive and very specific and circumscribed in 
the U.S. – arguably the most individualistic culture today. In this culture, emotional 
expression is normative unless otherwise specified. But, in many other cultures especially 
in East Asian cultures and even in some of seemingly individualistic European cultures as 
well, emotional inhibition might turn out to be normative in principle. Given this as a 
backdrop, display rules might prove to take forms of privilege rather than prohibition. 
Future work should explore this possibility. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of the current study is that the data were entirely correlational. We 
believe that this consideration should be weighed against the obvious value of being able 
to test predictions with empirical data from large-scale random samples of research 
participants. Moreover, while the conclusion that high social status causally increases 
anger expression for Japanese may be held with reasonably high confidence, greater 
caution may be warranted for the conclusion about American participants. On the basis of 
a reliable negative association between subjective social status and anger expression, we 
suggested that a reduced sense of social ranking in an in-group society might cause a 






interpretation must be further tested in future research that manipulates subjective social 
status in the two cultural settings. Additionally, we should also acknowledge that the 
current findings were based on self-reported measures of anger expression. Future work 
would benefit from overt behavioral measures of anger display and expression. 
These weaknesses notwithstanding, the current work is the first to integrate the 
two disparate aspects of anger within a single theoretical framework. This framework 
was instrumental in deriving our predictions on anger expression among Americans and 
Japanese who varied in subjective versus objective social status. Our conclusion that 
culture crucially moderates the linkage between social status and anger expression is 
important precisely because it highlights a rather surprising degree to which culture may 
be ingrained into the very core of the biological processes involved in the regulation and 
control of emotion (Mauss & Butler, 2010; Murata et al., in press). To further our 
understanding of the mutual influences between the biological and the social and thus to 
overcome the vicious dichotomy between nature and nurture, the field would benefit 
from a renewed focus on biological and neural processes as they are shaped and modified 
by specific aspects of social and cultural processes (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). This focus 
has received an increasing emphasis in a recently emerging field of cultural neuroscience 
(Chiao & Ambady, 2007; Han & Northoff, 2008; Kitayama & Park, 2010). Admittedly, 
our present work did not address either neural processes or biological markers of anger. 
However, at a broad conceptual level, our current effort should be regarded as an 
important initial step in this direction.  
Study 3: Clarifying the Links Between Social Support and Health: 









The last two decades of research in social and health psychology have established 
that availability of cohesive social support networks is integral to promoting both 
physical (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1989; O’Donovan & Hughes, 
2008; see Uchino et al., 1996 for a review) and mental health benefits (Brewin, Andrews, 
& Valentine, 2000; Kafetsios & Sideridis, 2006; seeLakey & Cronin, 2008 for a review; 
Lakey & Orehek, 2011). Conversely, the absence of such social resources, as typically 
captured by loneliness (Peplau & Perlman, 1982), presents a substantial health risk (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2010; Shiovitz-Ezra & Ayalon, 2010). Given the 
fundamental significance of social integration in health and wellbeing, it is rather 
surprising that some recent empirical papers have suggested that perceived support 
sometimes offers little benefit to health and adjustment. In this literature, by “perceived 
support” researchers typically mean the perception that one has received various kinds of 
emotional support such as compassion and encouragement from close others (see Bolger 
& Amarel, 2007 for a review). Summarizing this literature, Bolger and Amarel (2007) 
note, “most studies have found null or adverse relations between the receipt of support 
and adjustment (p. 458).”  
Several reasons have been put forth to account for the inconsistent relationships 
between perceived support and health, such as that perceived support may highlight one’s 
incompetence or lack of efficacy (Bolger & Amarel, 2007), or that support could evoke 
feelings of indebtedness in the recipient, which in turn may undermine self-esteem or 
self-efficacy (Gleason, Iida, Bolger, & Shrout, 2003; Newsom, 1999). Social support can 
also draw one’s attention to possible impositions and burdens on the provider of the 









received might not match the needs or expectations of the support recipient (Siewert, 
Antoniw, Kubiak, & Weber, 2011). Furthermore, reverse causation might be operative: 
people with poor health might require more support from others (Seidman, Shrout, & 
Bolger, 2006) 
Drawing on these considerations, the present work more systematically examined 
several factors that can jointly moderate the linkage between perceived support and 
health status of the support recipient. The overarching framework was guided by a focus 
on factors that serve to highlight or conceal the emotional costs of receiving social 
support. We considered three such factors.  
First, we anticipated that the emotional costs of perceived support would depend 
on a person’s cultural background. Considerable evidence indicates that cultures vary in 
the degree to which independence or interdependence is normatively sanctioned and used 
to organize daily practices and meanings (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991, 2010). In Western cultures, including the U.S. society, independence of the self 
from others is highly sanctioned. In this cultural context, support may be perceived as 
particularly troubling because it compromises one’s sense of independence from others 
(Uchida, Kitayama, Mesquita, Reyes, & Morling, 2008). In contrast, in East Asian 
cultures, especially in Japan, Korea, and China, interdependence of the self with others is 
strongly sanctioned. In this cultural context, support is likely to highlight the culturally 
endorsed and validated state of interdependence and, as a consequence, may be expected 
to entail less emotional cost. For example, if friends or family members are willing to 









the task of interdependence. Thus, the support-health linkage would be stronger and more 
positive for Asian than for American adults.  
Our second factor relates to perceived stress on the part of support recipients. Our 
analysis starts with an observation that, while perceived support is generally more norm-
congruous in Asian cultures, it can sometimes be troubling even for Asians. Kim and 
colleagues (2008) have argued that, especially in Asian, interdependent cultural contexts, 
recipients of social support sometimes worry that they may be causing troubles for the 
support-providers. Accordingly, the linkage between perceived support and health might 
only become positive if Asians are protected from this particular type of worry associated 
with receiving support. We anticipated that Asians would feel less worry if the support 
they received was necessary and, thus, its receipt was seen as justified. Miller and Bersoff 
(1992) found that especially in Asian contexts, interpersonal support is viewed as a moral 
obligation when there is a need for it. Such a need is obviously present when individuals 
are facing life difficulties and thus are stressed. It was thus predicted that the positive 
association between perceived support and health would be most strongly evident among 
Asians who reported high levels of stress, thereby justifying the support they were 
receiving.    
While Americans may also be concerned when they receive support, the nature of 
the concern they experience may be very different from the concern Asians experience. 
Because Americans tend to be more independent rather than interdependent, what they 
worry about may have less to do with the potential impositions they place on the support 
providers; instead, they may worry more about the likelihood that the need for support is 









2007). Note that while one’s own stressful state can be an effective excuse for imposing 
an inadvertent burden on the support provider and, thus, it can effectively mitigate the 
interpersonal cost of receipt of support, it is unlikely to mitigate a threat the receipt of 
support might impose on one’s self-efficacy. In other words, the receipt of support, even 
when confronted with high levels of stressful life events, may still signal a loss of 
independence and competence. Accordingly, we predicted that the linkage between 
perceived support and health would be less strongly evident among Americans regardless 
of their levels of perceived stress.  
Third, beyond the influence of cultural norms and life stress, whether social 
support is beneficial for health may vary depending on individual-level factors. Here, we 
focused on one particular facet of personality, neuroticism. Evidence is quite strong that 
neurotic people are attuned to negative emotional information (e.g., Eysenck, 1967; Gray, 
1982) because they carry negative interpretive cognitive schemas (e.g., Loo, 1984; 
Roberts & Kendler, 1999). It would follow, then, that neuroticism would sensitize people 
to potential costs associated with receipt of social support. We may thus predict that 
neuroticism will diminish any sustained benefits of support, thereby dampening the 
strength of the potentially positive relationship between perceived support and health 
(Karney & Bradbury, 1995). The converse of this logic is that the relationship between 
perceived support and health would be more positive for those who are relatively low in 
neuroticism.  
For the present analyses, we used a large comparative survey of Japanese and 
American adults to test the above hypotheses. Our focus was on the statistical association 









expected that the link between perceived support and health would be most evident 
among Japanese adults (from a support-approving cultural context) who reported high 
life stress (in a support requiring and seeking situation). Moreover, the perceived support-




Demographic, social, psychological and health data were compared from two 
linked surveys. From the second wave of the Midlife in the U.S. national study (MIDUS), 
we surveyed 1,054 adults (aged 34-84) who initially had been randomly sampled via 
phone as part of the full MIDUS sample, and then later volunteered for an additional 
overnight hospital analysis during which they completed another written questionnaire 
(representing a 71% retention rate from the first wave). For the parallel study in Japan, 
randomly selected respondents in the Tokyo metropolitan area within specific age, 
gender, and city ward categories completed a self-administered questionnaire based on 
MIDUS that had been translated and back-translated by native speakers. The response 
rate was 56.2%, yielding a sample of 1,027 adults (aged 30-79). The means and standard 
deviations (in parentheses) for 3 of our demographic variables were (listing Japanese 
results first): 1) Age – 54 (14), 55 (12) years; 2) Gender – female 51% (.5), 55% (.5); 3) 
Marital status – married 69% (.45), 72% (.45). The mean level of educational attainment 
was at least one-year of college (no degree) in Japan, and a two-year college or 










To assess perceived receipt of social support (e.g., caring, appreciation), 
participants reported the extent to which they received emotional support from their 
spouse or partner (6 items), other family members (4 items), and friends (4 items) (αs 
= .86 and .88, for Japanese and Americans, respectively; Schuster, Kessler, & Aseltine, 
1990; Walen & Lachman, 2000). For example, participants were asked to indicate how 
much their friends (family or spouse) really care about them or understand the way they 
feel about things. Perceived stress was assessed by the 10-item Perceived Stress Scale 
(PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983; αs = .76 and .86). Participants rated the 
degree to which they experienced various forms of stress during the last month. Physical 
health was assessed by scoring the number of chronic health problems respondents 
experienced in the past 12 months (maximum of 30, e.g., diabetes). We also assessed 
perceived health by averaging 3 mutually correlated self-ratings of current health, future 
health, and control over health (αs = .79 and .69). Neuroticism was assessed by self-
ratings of four pertinent personality traits: moody, worrying, nervous, and calm (reverse-
coded). Participants rated how much each of the adjectives describes them (1 = not at all, 
4 = a lot) (Rossi, 2001; e.g., moody and nervous; αs = .51 and .76). Although the 
reliability for Japanese is rather low (α = .51), it is likely due to the small number of 
items used to assess this construct (Schmitt, 1996). Descriptive statistics and 
intercorrelations for our key variables are summarized in Table 3.2.  
In addition, several variables that could potentially confound the support-health 
linkage were controlled. Subjective social class was controlled because middle (vs. 
working) class people are more likely to receive support and, simultaneously, they are 









support. Subjective social class standing was measured by asking participants to rank 
their relative standing in the community by placing themselves on a ladder with respect to 
where they feel they stand (1 = lowest, 10 = highest; Goodman et al., 2001), as well as to 
rate the extent to which they feel they have enough money to meet their needs (1 = not 
enough, 3 = more than enough). The ratings from these two measures were standardized 
and averaged within each culture. We also controlled for self-sufficiency (Lachman & 
Weaver, 1997; αs = .44 and .67), optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985; αs = .58 and .67), 
and self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; αs = .66 and .78), because these variables are likely to 
be positively associated with both perceived support and health. To further sharpen our 
analysis on neuroticism, we controlled for the remaining four of the Big Five personality 
traits (Rossi, 2001; extraversion, αs = .83 and .78, conscientiousness, αs = .57 and .61, 
agreeableness, αs = .87 and .82, openness to experience, αs = .84 and .77).  
Results 
Focusing on three potential moderators of the link between perceived support and 
health, we formulated four specific predictions. First, we predicted that the association 
between perceived support and health would be greater for Japanese than for Americans. 
Second, however, the benefits Japanese would obtain from perceived support were 
expected to be greater when they were under stress (i.e., when the receipt of support was 
justified). The support-health association was thus predicted to be especially strong for 
Japanese under stress. Third, we predicted that there would be no such effect of stress for 
Americans. In combination, the first three predictions imply an interaction among culture, 
support, and stress. Fourth, we also anticipated that the positive support-health 









low in neuroticism. This prediction implies an interaction among culture, support, and 
neuroticism. 
A step-wise regression was performed on the reported number of chronic health 
problems. In Step 1, we entered demographic variables (age, gender, subjective social 
class), as well as the control personality variables (extraversion, conscientiousness, 
openness to experience, agreeableness, self-sufficiency, optimism, and self-esteem). In 
Step 2, four variables germane to our hypotheses and questions, i.e., social support, 
neuroticism, culture, and perceived stress, were entered. Steps 3 and 4 involved all 2-way 
interactions and all 3-way interactions among these variables, respectively. In Step 5, we 
entered the 4-way interaction among them. To address potential statistical issues of 
multicollinearity, centered scores were used to compute interaction terms (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983; Cronbach, 1987). Table 3.3 summarizes findings from the regression.  
As predicted, the Support x Stress x Culture interaction proved to be significant, b 
= .10, t(1989) = 2.84 p < .005. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the link between perceived 
support and the number of chronic health problems was significantly negative only for 
Japanese who reported being under a lot of stress, b = -.45, t(969) = -2.58, p < .01. This 
association was less evident for Japanese who were not as stressed, b = .25, t(969) = 1.30, 
ns. The Support x Stress interaction was significant for Japanese, b = -.06, t(969) = -2.89, 
p < .005. Among Americans, however, the link between perceived support and health 
was negligible regardless of stress, ts(1018) < 1. The Support x Stress interaction was 
statistically trivial for Americans, t < 1.   
Second, the predicted interaction among culture, support, and neuroticism did not 









interaction involving support, stress, culture, and neuroticism approached statistical 
significance, b = -.09, t(1989) = -1.83, p < .07. As can be seen in Table 3.4, this 4-way 
interaction resulted from the fact that the Support x Stress x Culture interaction shown in 
Figure 3.3 was significant only for low-neuroticism individuals, b = .14, t(1135) = 3.18, p 
< .005. The support-health link was not significant for either their high-neuroticism 
counterparts or Americans. The American result did not depend on stress levels or 
degrees of neuroticism.  
We also analyzed the self-assessed health index and found a pattern that 
corresponded closely to the results for the number of chronic health problems (see Table 
3.2). The 4-way interaction was significant, b = .03, t(2002) = 1.94, p = .05. As shown in 
Table 3, the link between perceived support and self-assessed health was generally 
negligible, except for the low-neuroticism Japanese who reported relatively high levels of 
stress, b = .28, t(522) = 2.94, p < .005. This pattern of results replicated the pattern 
determined for the measure of chronic health conditions. 
Discussion 
The novel finding here is that perceived support emerged as most beneficial in the 
context of both support-approving cultural norms (interdependence) and support-
requiring situational factors (stressful events). Moreover, this effect appeared to be 
especially strong for those who have support-accepting personal styles (free from 
negativism of neuroticism).  
Future work should explore the generality of this 4-way interaction we identified. 
For example, it would be important to replicate the current findings in other independent 









this, it will also be informative to examine whether the association between perceived 
support and health might be modulated by individual differences in independence or 
interdependence within each culture. Will even Americans show health benefits of 
perceived support if they are highly interdependent or, conversely, will even Asians show 
little or no effect of perceived support if they are highly independent?  
One limitation of the current study is that it was correlational, which made it 
impossible to establish causality. However, we controlled for a number of the 
confounding variables that could produce spurious correlations between perceived 
support and health. Moreover, our finding is less likely to reflect reverse causality, since 
healthy people are unlikely to solicit more support from their close companions and care 
providers than do unhealthy people. We may thus rule out an a priori causal link from 
health status to support as the reason for positive associations between support and health. 
Conversely, one could plausibly argue that support in fact has a causal impact on health, 
at least for low-neuroticism Japanese who feel they are living with sustained stress.  
Nevertheless, in order to establish causality, the present work may be usefully 
supplemented by studies with experimental manipulations of both support and cultural 
values. For example, future research should examine whether recall of past experiences 
of having received support might differentially increase subjective wellbeing of 
individuals as a function of priming of independence or interdependence. We expect that 
the recall of previous support experience would increase subjective wellbeing more if 
interdependence were primed than if independence was primed. 
 The pattern we found for low-neuroticism Japanese is reminiscent of the classic 









health consequences of stress (Cohen, 1992; Lakey & Orehek, 2011). The fact that a 
clearer pattern emerged for the Japanese, as anticipated by our initial hypotheses 
(illustrated in Figure 3.3) – at least among those with low propensities toward 
neuroticism – but not for Americans, might suggest that the buffering hypothesis is even 
more valid in interdependent, rather than independent, cultural contexts. 
We should hasten to add that the buffering effect of social support on health 
surely does occur under certain circumstances for Americans. Evidence suggests that the 
primary emotional cost of perceived support for Americans is a threat to the positive 
evaluation of the self as independent and self-efficacious (Bolger & Amarel, 2007). 
Hence, the buffering effect might be more evident with implicit, rather than explicit 
support. Likewise, it might also occur if the support highlights one’s accomplishment 
(e.g., reminding both self and others of various stresses associated with a high-profiling 
job), rather than pointing to her weaknesses. Cross-cultural research along this line will 
help us develop more efficacious, sensitive, and value-specific interventions to improve 
the health status of individuals living in varying life circumstances in different cultures 
and countries. 
We started this paper by referring to the body of literature that demonstrates 
substantial health benefits of social integration (Seidman et al., 2006). To conclude this 
paper, then, we wish to anchor the current finding to this broader literature. The general 
conclusion that the link between perceived support (the perception that one has received 
support) and health is elusive (Bolger & Amarel, 2007) would seem rather surprising and 
even paradoxical because perceived social support is such a face-valid, prima-facie 









support is a double-edged sword. It offers a much-needed assurance of social integration, 
while at the same time it entails a variety of emotional costs. Like an insurance policy, 
then, social support may be most beneficial, enabling one to achieve the peace of mind 
while living an active life, thereby promoting health and wellbeing, when one has it 






Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for key variables in Study 2 
 














1. Objective social status 1254 -0.04 0.92 .18 *** -.01 -.16 *** .29 ***
2. Subjective social status 1232 6.56 1.81 -.11 *** -.16 *** .26 ***
3. Anger expression 1251 12.91 3.30 .15 *** -.08 **
4. Frustration 1249 2.35 1.06 -.14 ***
5. Decision authority 885 22.27 5.09
N M SD
1. Objective social status 1021 -0.05 0.87 .23 *** .15 *** .04 .32 ***
2. Subjective social status 989 6.03 2.11 -.02 -.13 *** .31 ***
3. Anger expression 1019 12.17 3.43 .26 *** .13 ***
4. Frustration 1018 1.87 0.86 -.02
5. Decision authority 731 19.83 5.42


















Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for key variables in Study 3 
 


















1. Perceived support 1025 2.62 0.50 -0.15 *** -0.12 *** -0.08 ** 0.24 ***
2. Perceived stress 936 4.37 0.78 0.21 *** 0.22 *** -0.15 ***
3. Neuroticism 1023 2.11 0.56 0.18 *** -0.23 ***
4. Chronic health condition 1012 2.30 1.99 -0.29 ***
5. Self-assessed health 1027 5.78 1.66
n M SD
1. Perceived support 1052 3.48 0.46 -0.21 *** -0.24 *** -0.10 *** 0.22 ***
2. Perceived stress 1054 4.92 1.10 0.12 *** 0.15 *** -0.09 ***
3. Neuroticism 1050 2.03 0.63 0.22 *** -0.25 ***
4. Chronic health condition 1054 2.30 2.34 -0.44 ***
5. Self-assessed health 1054 7.49 1.40
2 3 4 5Japanese


















Table 3.3 Unstandardized regression coefficients in predicting number of chronic health problems and self-assessment measure of 
health as a function of culture, perceived support, perceived stress, and neuroticism in Study 3 
Note. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
       Beta         Beta
Gender 0.250 5.271 *** 0.032 2.074 *
Age 0.034 9.054 *** -0.005 -4.158 ***
Subjective social class -0.200 -3.058 *** 0.072 3.386 ***
Extraversion -0.043 -0.409 0.072 2.104 *
Openness to experience 0.318 2.990 *** 0.015 0.419
Conscientiousness -0.097 -0.888 0.136 3.845 ***
Agreeableness 0.228 2.048 * -0.027 -0.739
Optimism -0.054 -2.229 * 0.019 2.468 *
Self-sufficiency -0.035 -0.583 0.022 1.119
Self-esteem -0.017 -1.776 † 0.011 3.582 ***
Culture 0.211 1.341 0.401 7.854 ***
Perceived support 0.008 0.052 0.136 2.684 **
Perceived stress 0.061 4.414 *** -0.026 -5.920 ***
Neuroticism 0.372 2.511 * -0.095 -1.986 *
Culture x Perceived support -0.017 -0.078 -0.125 -1.763 †
Culture x Perceived stress -0.034 -1.883 † 0.009 1.498
Culture x Neuroticism 0.114 0.594 0.065 1.049
Perceived support x Perceived stress -0.065 -2.792 *** 0.012 1.637
Perceived support x Neuroticism 0.349 1.258 -0.093 -1.034
Perceived stress x Neuroticism 0.029 1.570 -0.007 -1.136
Culture x Perceived support x Perceived stress 0.096 2.841 *** -0.014 -1.295
Culture x Perceived support x Neuroticism -0.639 -1.760 † 0.138 1.168
Culture x Perceived stress x Neuroticism -0.041 -1.679 † 0.013 1.600
Perceived support x Perceived stress x Neuroticism 0.014 0.392 -0.012 -1.052
Culture x Perceived support x Perceived stress x Neuroticism -0.085 -1.825 † 0.001 † 0.029 1.937 * 0.001 *
Predictors
Number of Chronic Health Problems Self-Assessment Measure of Health
      t-test R2 increase       t-test R2 increase
**** 0.340 ***









Table 3.4 Unstandardized regression coefficients used to predict health status as a function of perceived support as a function of 
neuroticism, culture and perceived stress in Study 3 
  




High neuroticism -0.24 0.31 0.02 0.13
Low neuroticism -0.66 *** 0.25 0.12 -0.66 †
High neuroticism 0.14 0.10 0.05 -0.01
Low neuroticism 0.28 *** 0.08 -0.01 0.07
Japanese Americans
Number of chronic health problems
Self-assessed health






Figure 3.1 The effects of subjective social status (A) and objective social status (B) on 
anger expression for Americans (blue line) and Japanese (red line) in Study 2. Americans 
with lower subjective social status expressed anger more frequently than those with 
higher subjective social status, while Japanese with higher objective social status 
expressed anger more frequently than those with lower objective social status. Statistical 
significance is indicated by asterisks (***p < .001). 
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Figure 3.2 Results of path analyses examining the role of frustration (Panel A) and 
decision authority (Panel B) in mediating the effect of social status and anger expression 
for Americans (N = 1218) and Japanese (N = 705), respectively in Study 2. 
Unstandardized coefficients are shown. The values in parentheses show the relationship 
between subjective (objective) social status and anger expression and the dependent 
variables after controlling for frustration (decision authority). The values in square 
brackets are 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals from a bootstrap test with 2000 
replications; the mediation is significant if the confidence interval does not include zero.  
 
 




















Subjective Social Status Anger Expression Frustration 
 -.03* .25** 
 -.10† (-.09) 
Panel A: Americans 
Objective Social Status Anger Expression Decision Authority 
 1.49***  .08** 
.34* (.24) 






Figure 3.3 The 3-way interaction between Support x Stress x Culture with respect to the 
influence on number of chronic health problems in Study 3. The link between receipt of 
support and chronic health problems was significant only for Japanese who report being 
under high stress.  
 










Culture and Motivation 
 
Chapter IV examines the neural processes underlying cultural moderation in 
motivational processes. It focused on two notable themes of research that pertain to 
motivational processes: self-serving bias and social evaluative threat. Study 4 identified a 
neurophysiological signal of the motivational force towards the pursuit of self-interest as 
an attempt to understand cultural variation in self-serving bias. Study 5 examined a neural 
response to social evaluative threat elicited by the presence of social eyes, and further 
explored how such threat influences task motivation of European Americans and Asians. 
In both studies, error-related negativity (ERN), a negative voltage deflection that occurs 
in response to error commission in choice response tasks (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, 
Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) was 
assessed as a neurophysiological index of motivational significance.  
Study 4: Error Related Brain Activity Reveals Self-Centric Motivation: 
Culture Matters 
Self-interest is considered a fundamental human motive. In fact, many currents of 
modern Western thought, including theories in both neo-classic economics (Hobbes, 
1651; Smith, 1759) and social and behavioral sciences (Campbell, 1975; Greenwald, 
1980), are built on this premise. The current work presents evidence that this assumption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




is ingrained into a basic neural mechanism of error processing. It also shows that the 
degree to which the neural mechanism is modulated by self-interest is culturally bound.  
To illustrate the central significance of self-interest, consider self-serving bias 
(Langer, 1975; Miller & Ross, 1975). People have a strong tendency to make self-
flattering judgments and inferences, as documented in many domains including judgment 
and decision-making (Langer, 1975), self-perception (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & 
Holzberg, 1989), and attribution (Miller & Ross, 1975). For example, individuals take 
credit for their success while blaming external influences for their failure (Miller & Ross, 
1975). Likewise, they tend to have unrealistically inflated and optimistic views of 
themselves (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Self-serving bias is believed to result from 
motivated reasoning, wherein one’s attention, inference, and hypothesis testing are 
guided by a strong motivational concern for the welfare of the self (Kunda, 1990; Leary, 
2007). This drive for the pursuit of self-interest may be called the self-centric motivation 
(SCM). We may hypothesize that SCM is an important motivational precursor for self-
serving bias. 
At present, the exact nature of SCM remains uncertain. In particular, whereas 
SCM might sometimes be derived from a conscious goal to present the self in a favorable 
light (Schlenker, 1980), it might also have a deeper neurophysiological root. For 
example, it is conceivable that once the self becomes relevant, neural mechanisms of 
“wanting” – the mesocorticolimbic system modulating incentive salience (Berridge, 
2012) – are recruited automatically and unconsciously. The reward value of achieving a 
desired outcome may be enhanced as a result. This may explain why people work hard 






If SCM has a deep neurobiological basis, there should be a neuro-cortical marker 
of this motivation. The primary aim of the current work was to test this idea by 
examining neural responses involved in error monitoring (error-related negativity; ERN) 
(Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). The ERN, which originates in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; Holroyd, Dien, & Coles, 1998; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997), 
has been shown to increase as a function of motivational significance associated with the 
task at hand (Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). We 
therefore tested whether the ERN would be greater when an erroneous response was 
made in tasks people performed to earn reward points for the self, relative to when such 
an error was made in tasks they performed to earn reward points for a same-sex friend.  
 Another important aim of the current work was to examine possible cultural 
variation in the neural marker of SCM. Over the last two decades, numerous cross-
cultural studies have shown that self-serving effects are much weaker among Asians than 
among European Americans (Heine et al., 1999). For example, self-serving attributions 
of success and failure appear quite weak in Asia (Kitayama, Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995) 
and, likewise, Asians tend to hold more realistic assessments of the self vis-à-vis others 
(Heine & Lehman, 1995). The attenuation of self-serving bias among Asians might be 
due to a deliberate self-presentation fostered by the culture’s modesty norm. However, if 
Asians should show an attenuated self-centric effect even in the ERN – a neural activity 
that is arguably automatic and subconscious (Amodio et al., 2004) – this would suggest 
potential cross-cultural variability in the primacy of self-interest. 
To address this issue, we monitored European American and Asian participants’ 






earn reward points for themselves and for their close, same-sex friend. We made two 
predictions. First, for European Americans, who are likely to be high in SCM, the ERN 
amplitudes should be larger in the self-condition than in the friend-condition. Second, for 
Asians, who are likely to be lower in SCM, the ERN amplitude difference between the 
self- and the friend-conditions would be attenuated.  
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-nine University of Michigan undergraduates participated in the study (24 
females, Mage = 19.59, SDage = 1.37). Nineteen were European Americans (14 females, 
Mage = 19.47, SDage = 1.31), and the remaining 20 were Asians (10 females, Mage = 19.70, 
SDage = 1.45). Nine Asian participants were born in China, Korea, or Japan, spending no 
more than 7 years in the U.S. (4 females, Mage = 20.56, SDage = 1.33), and the remaining 
11 participants were Asian Americans, who were born in the U.S. (6 females, Mage = 
19.00, SDage = 1.18). Participants received $20 or course credit in exchange for their 
participation. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. No gender effect was found. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were told that their brain activities would be 
monitored while performing a simple computer task. They were further told that their 
goal was to earn as many reward points as possible to receive gifts for both themselves 
and a close, same sex friend of their own choice. Participants were presented with a list of 






and another for their friend from the list based on the points they would earn from the 
computer task.  
After the attachment of EEG electrodes, participants were asked to perform a 
letter version of the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). The stimuli were presented 
on a Dell E551c 15 inch CRT monitor using E-Prime software version 1.1 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.). Participants were instructed to identify a center letter among a set 
of five letters that were flashed at the center of the screen (HHHHH, SSSSS, HHSHH, or 
SSHSS). Forty percent of the trials were congruent trials (HHHHH or SSSSS), and the 
remaining 60 percent were incongruent trials (HHSHH or SSHSS). Each letter sequence 
occupied 0.4° of visual angle vertically and 2.2° horizontally. Each trial started with a 
fixation cross that appeared at the center of the screen for 100ms. After a display of a 
blank screen for 300ms, participants saw one of the four letter sequences, which lasted on 
the screen for 100ms. They reported the identity of the center letter by pressing one of 
two response keys on the typing board. The key assignments were counterbalanced 
across participants. 900ms after each response, the next trial started. 
The computer task consisted of a total of 16 blocks, with 60 trials in each block 
(960 trials in total). Half of the blocks were self-blocks and the remaining half were 
friend-blocks. Participants were told that their response would be monitored and that 
correct responses that were faster than a certain pre-designated cut-off in response time 
would be converted into points. In all blocks, they were encouraged to respond as quickly 
as possible without sacrificing accuracy. Furthermore, in order to keep the error rate 
around 10%, whenever the error rate in a given block exceeded (or did not reach) 10%, 






addition, participants were further told that they would have an opportunity to use the 
points they would earn during the self-blocks and the friend-blocks to choose one gift 
item each for themselves and another gift for their friends, respectively. The order of the 
self vs. friend-blocks was counterbalanced across participants, such that half of the 
participants performed the self-blocks first (i.e., 4 self, 4 friend, 4 self, and 4 friend) and 
the other half performed the friend-blocks first (i.e., 4 friend, 4 self, 4 friend, and 4 self).  
Physiological Recording and Processing 
The EEG was recorded with 64 electrodes placed according to the extended 
International 10/20-System in a nylon cap, and referenced to the left mastoid. The 
electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from additional channels at the outer canthi of 
both eyes and above and below the left eye. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a 
band-pass of DC to 100Hz by BioSemi ActiveTwo system, and sampled with 512Hz. All 
data were re-referenced to the averaged left and right mastoid and then resampled at 
256Hz. The data was baseline corrected by using 200ms-100ms pre-response voltage, 
and corrected for ocular artifacts (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983). The EEG recordings 
for incorrect and correct responses were then averaged separately. Trials with amplitudes 
exceeding ±100µV were eliminated from the final averages. The number of error trials 
included in the analysis after artifact rejection was no different across the cultural groups 
(European Americans; M = 60.76, SE = 7.07, Asians; M = 64.50, SE = 6.89), and/or 
between the self- and friend-conditions (self-condition; M = 61.53, SE = 5.09, friend-
condition; M = 63.73, SE = 7.49), Fs < 1. The ERN peaked around 35ms after erroneous 
responses; it was therefore quantified as the mean amplitude between 10ms and 60ms 







 After the flanker task, participants filled out a 24-item Singelis self-construal 
scale (Singelis, 1994), which yielded separate scores for independent self-construal (e.g., 
I always try to have my own opinions; αs = .78 and .82, for European Americans and 
Asians, respectively) and interdependent self-construal (e.g., I avoid having conflicts with 
members of my group; αs = .54 and .75). The two cultural groups did not differ on the 
independent self-construal (European Americans: 4.82 vs. Asians: 4.88), F < 1, but 
Asians were marginally more interdependent than European Americans (4.98 vs. 4.64), 
F(1, 37) = 3.54, p < .07, ηp2 = .09. Participants then filled out measures that assessed the 
quality of the relationship with the friend they chose as a recipient of the gift they earned. 
The two cultural groups were no different in perceived closeness (IOS; Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992) (European Americans: 4.89 vs. Asians: 4.20), length of the relationship 
(4.26 years vs. 3.45 years), and supportiveness (ISLE; Cohen, Mermelstein, Kamarck, & 
Hoberman, 1985) (4.46 vs. 4.04), Fs ≤ 2.72, p > .10. Nor did they predict task 
performance or ERN responses, Fs < 1. 
We also included questions designed to assess participants’ motivation to perform 
the task well in both the self-condition and the friend-condition. Participants were asked 
to indicate how engaged they were when they performed the task in the self-condition 
and in the friend-condition. Both cultural groups did not differ in the degree of task 
engagement (European Americans: 4.82 vs. 4.82 for the self-condition and the friend-
condition, respectively, Asians; 5.03 vs. 5.08), Fs < 1. Participants also reported that they 
were equally satisfied with their performance in the two conditions (European 







A post-experimental questionnaire showed that the friends that European 
American and Asian participants chose were no different in terms of perceived closeness 
(4.89 vs. 4.20 for European Americans and Asians, respectively, F = 2.26, p > .14), 
length of relationship (4.26 vs. 3.45, F < 1), and perceived supportiveness (4.46 vs. 4.04, 
F = 2.72, p > .10). Participants were also reportedly engaged as strongly in the task of 
earning points for the self as they were in the task of earning points for the friend 
(European Americans: 4.82 vs. 4.82, Asians; 5.03 vs. 5.08), Fs < 1. We also found little 
difference in the performance of the flanker task between the self-condition and the 
friend-condition regardless of the cultural backgrounds of participants (accuracy: 88.77 
vs. 88.41 for European Americans and 87.36 vs. 87.23 for Asians; correct trial RTs: 
306.93ms vs. 309.08ms for European Americans and 269.25ms vs. 271.22ms for Asians; 
error trial RTs: 253.40ms vs. 248.56ms for European Americans and 203.17ms vs. 
209.29ms for Asians), Fs < 1. At the levels of conscious judgment as well as observable 
behavior, then, both European American and Asian participants appear to have worked as 
hard for their friends as they did for themselves.  
An analysis of the ERN amplitude revealed a remarkably different picture, 
however. European Americans showed a clear self-centric effect (see Figs. 4.1-A and B). 
The ERN (relative to CRN)1 was significantly greater in the self-condition than in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although the magnitude of CRN (correct-response negativity) did not vary as a function of either culture 
or condition, it was somewhat more positive for Asians than for European Americans, (6.46 vs. 4.38), F(1, 
37) = 2.53, p = .12. To take this difference into account, we analyzed the ERN-CRN difference scores. The 
analysis on the ERN amplitudes produced similar results.  The Culture x Condition interaction proved 
significant on the ERN amplitudes, F(1, 31) = 7.34, p < .05, ηp2 = .19. ERN was significantly larger in the 
self-condition than in the friend-condition for European Americans (-7.02 vs. -4.42), F(1, 15) = 9.45, p 







friend-condition (-12.04 vs. -9.06), F(1, 15) = 10.93, p < .005, ηp2 = .42. This pattern 
demonstrates the existence of SCM, insofar as the same event becomes motivationally 
more significant, at the neural level, when it implicates the interest of the self vs. other. In 
contrast, there was no ERN difference between the self-condition and the friend-
condition for Asians (-9.79 vs. -10.04), F(1, 16) < 1 (see Figs. 4.1-C and D). Thus, 
consistent with previous cross-cultural work, we found no evidence of SCM among 
Asians. The Culture x Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 31) = 9.08, p < .005, ηp2 
= .23. The relevant means are displayed in Fig. 4.2-A. 
Previous work suggests that increased ERN is often accompanied by post-error 
slowing – a prolonged response time on a trial subsequent to commission of an error. 
Post-error slowing is considered to reflect one’s effort to avoid making a further error on 
the subsequent trial after an error, commonly assessed by subtracting each participant’s 
average response time on post-correct trials from the average response time on post-error 
trials (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). As shown in Fig. 4.2-B, European Americans showed a 
significant post-error slowing in the self-condition (18.87), F(1, 15) = 18.69, p < .001, ηp2 
= .56, but not in the friend-condition (5.78), F = 1.72, p > .20. In contrast, the post-error 
slowing for Asians was virtually absent for both self- and friend-conditions (-.89 vs. 1.65), 
Fs < 1. The Culture x Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 30) = 4.91, p < .05, ηp2 
= .14. 
Because interdependent social relations require attention and care paid to others, 
attention to the personal self that is detached from social relations in general and 
commitment to the self-interest in particular may be antithetical to interdependence 






negatively predict SCM. Two indices of SCM were obtained by subtracting the self-
condition ERN-CRN from the friend-condition ERN-CRN, on the one hand, and the 
friend-condition post-error slowing from the self-condition post-error slowing, on the 
other. For both measures, positive scores show greater SCM. These two indices were 
significantly correlated (r = .38, p < .05). Interdependent self-construal was assessed by 
the Singelis self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994). As expected, Asians were more 
interdependent than European Americans (4.98 vs. 4.64), although the difference was 
statistically marginal, F(1, 37) = 3.54, p < .07, ηp2 = .09. Of importance, interdependent 
self-construal was negatively associated with both indices of SCM (ERN-CRN: r = -.42, 
p < .01, post-error slowing; r = -.35, p < .05, with the two cultural groups collapsed; see 
Figs. 4.3-A and B). This was the case even after statistically controlling for culture for the 
ERN (r = -.38, p < .05) although the effect of interdependence on post-error slowing 
became non-significant once culture was controlled (r = -.21, ns). 
Discussion 
The present work is the first to demonstrate a neural substrate of SCM. For 
European Americans, an event became motivationally more significant when it was 
relevant to the interest of the self than when it was relevant to the interest of someone 
else. As a consequence, they monitored errors in the relevant task more closely (as 
revealed in the increased magnitude of ERN) and accommodated their behaviors after 
errors to improve their future performance (as revealed in the increased post-error 
slowing) in the self-condition. It is noteworthy that we used one’s close friend as the 
relevant other. In fact, our participants reported that they were engaged as much in the 






Nevertheless, both ERN and post-error slowing revealed rather striking self-centric 
effects. Previous work shows that ERN originates from the anterior cingulate cortex and 
plays a significant role in monitoring errors (Holroyd et al., 1998; Miltner et al., 1997). 
The fact that the operation of SCM is observed at such a low-level process attests to the 
primacy and robustness of this motivation. The enhanced motivation linked to the self, 
demonstrated here, would guide subsequent cognitive processes such as attention, 
inference, and hypothesis testing to further inflate perceived worthiness of the self 
(Kunda, 1990). Our analysis, then, implies that SCM is an important precursor of self-
serving bias. Future research should directly test this idea by examining whether our 
ERN-based measure of SCM predicts self-serving bias.  
Given the robustness of the self-centric effect observed for European Americans, 
it is striking to observe no such effect for Asians. This evidence, however, is consistent 
with an increasing body of cross-cultural work showing that Asians are much less likely 
than European Americans to show self-serving bias. The finding that the self-centric 
effect was absent, not only in self-reports, but also in both ERN and post-error slowing, 
indicates that the absence of self-serving bias among Asians is not due merely to self-
presentation. The finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that in Asian cultural 
contexts, interdependence is emphasized and, as a consequence, significant others are 
incorporated into the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
European Americans reported that they worked just as hard for their friends as 
they did for themselves. Yet, this claim was contradicted by our tacit indicators (ERN and 
post-error slowing), which showed clear self-centric effects. The impartiality these 






Alternatively, the self-report ratings might reflect what our European American 
participants genuinely believed about their own behaviors and, if so, the conscious 
awareness regarding their own impartiality might prove to be self-deceptive. This issue 
deserves further investigation.   
Researchers have documented that many psychological findings are limited to 
people from Western, Industrial, Educated, Rich, and Democratic (or WEIRD) societies 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Our finding extends this claim by demonstrating 
that the primacy of self-interest, widely assumed as universal in the current social and 
behavioral science literature, must be qualified. Future work should examine alternative 
principles of motivation to account for various behavioral characteristics that are more 
evident among non-Western populations. 
Study 5: Interdependent Selves Show Face-Induced Facilitation of Error 
Processing: Cultural Neuroscience of Self-Threat 
Both evolutionary and cultural considerations suggest that humans are highly 
attuned to their own conspecifics (Tomasello, 1999). This sensitivity is revealed in the 
fact that an awareness of someone watching the self – or the awareness of social eyes – 
plays an important role in the regulation of one’s own behaviors (Kitayama et al., 2004; 
Na & Kitayama, 2011). For example, when exposed to a watching face, individuals 
become more prosocial (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Rigdon et al., 2009). Because self-
regulation in social settings is often facilitated by knowing how others might evaluate the 
self, it stands to reason that at least for some people, mere exposure to social eyes might 
be sufficient to automatically evoke a concern about potentially negative social 






(herein called social evaluative threat) may increase vigilance for one’s errors on a task at 
hand. In the current work, we explored this hypothesis by using an electrophysiological 
signal of error monitoring called error-related negativity (ERN).  
There is a general consensus in the literature that social belongingness is a 
fundamental human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1988). Because 
positive social evaluations imply social acceptance, it should not come as any surprise 
that these evaluations are integral to psychological well-being (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia, 2003). Conversely, when one is socially 
rejected or negatively evaluated and, thus, one’s positive social image is threatened, a 
variety of adverse psychological and physiological reactions can follow. For example, a 
social evaluative threat can lead to both a decrease in social self-esteem (Gruenewald, 
Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004) and an increase in physiological stress responses such as 
cortisol secretion (Dickerson, Mycek, & Zaldivar, 2008) and production of pro-
inflammatory cytokines (Kemeny & Gruenewald, 2000). It would seem reasonable, then, 
that people are sometimes highly vigilant for social evaluative threats that might present 
themselves. Among many social cues, an image of a watching face may signal a potential 
threat of this kind, insofar as there is a good chance that the watching person observes 
and evaluates the self (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Kitayama et al., 2004; Rigdon et al., 
2009). 
Of course, this is not to say that all individuals are equally sensitive to social 
evaluative threats posed by a watching face. Previous work suggests that some 
individuals may be more likely to draw on social evaluations such as “honor” and “face” 






self and self-identity is defined relationally, in terms of its belongingness in a meaningful 
social relationship, is captured by interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). People who are high in interdependent self-construal are likely to rely heavily on 
social evaluations in developing and maintaining their positive self-identities. 
Conversely, people with independent self-construals are likely to define the self in terms 
of their own appraisals of the self rather than relying on evaluations held by others. Thus, 
it may be anticipated that those with interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal will 
be more sensitive to social evaluative threats (Kim & Markman, 2006). One important 
corollary of this analysis is that Asians may be more likely than European Americans to 
be sensitive to social evaluative threats because the former tend to be more 
interdependent (and less independent) than the latter (Oyserman et al., 2002; Singelis, 
1994). 
The degree to which a social evaluative threat is automatically evoked may be 
captured by a neurophysiological response called error-related negativity (ERN). The 
ERN refers to a sharp negative voltage deflection that occurs in response to error 
commission in choice response tasks (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). The 
ERN is assumed to index an early, automatic detection of unfavorable outcomes 
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), which does not necessarily rely on conscious 
reflection (Amodio et al., 2004). Although the ERN is typically conceptualized as a 
marker of cognitive processing of error/conflict detection (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004), recent findings suggest that 
it can also reflect affective reactions such as a response to threat (Hajcak, 2012; 






positively correlated with a defensive startle response after errors, a common reaction to 
threatening stimuli (Hajcak & Foti, 2008). Moreover, both negative affectivity and 
behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which are implicated in the sensitivity to threat 
(Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1994), are positively correlated with the ERN (Boksem, 
Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Dikman & Allen, 2000; Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 
2000). Importantly, recent work has shown that when negative arousal or threat is 
mitigated by a misattribution procedure (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, in press) or priming of 
religious belief systems (Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010), the ERN is reduced substantially. 
In the present work, as a social cue signaling a potential threat to the self, we used 
an image of a watching face. We presented this image as a priming stimulus on some 
trials of a flanker task while monitoring participants’ brain responses using 
electroencephalogram (EEG). If face priming were sufficient to automatically evoke a 
social evaluative threat, thereby increasing vigilance for errors, especially for 
interdependent people, this should improve performance in the flanker task while 
increasing the ERN amplitude at the same time. We thus made the following three 
predictions.  
1. Performance of the flanker task should be better in the face priming condition 
than in the control condition, but this improvement of task performance in the 
face priming (vs. control) condition should be more pronounced for those higher 
in interdependent self-construal.  
2. The ERN should be larger in magnitude in the face priming condition than in the 






condition should be more pronounced for those higher in interdependent self-
construal.  
3. Asians would be more interdependent than European Americans. It would 
therefore follow that both the improvement of task performance and the increase 
of the ERN amplitude in the face priming (vs. control) condition should be more 
pronounced for Asians than for European Americans. 
Method        
Participants 
 Thirty-seven undergraduates at the University of Michigan (18 males, Mage = 
20.81, SDage = 2.39) participated in the study in exchange for $30. Nineteen were 
European Americans (10 males, Mage = 20.16, SDage = 1.68), and the remaining eighteen 
were East Asians (8 males, Mage = 21.53, SDage = 2.87). All Asian participants were born 
in China, Korea, or Japan, spending no more than 9 years in the U.S. All participants 
were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No gender effect was 
found. 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants were told that the study would test brain responses 
during a cognitive task. Following attachment of EEG electrodes, participants were given 
an arrowhead version of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) in a dimly lit, 
sound attenuated room. Participants were seated approximately 60cm from a 15-inch 
CRT color monitor.  
The flanker task consisted of 30 blocks of 48 trials. Each trial involved the 






block varied in prime type (face, scrambled face, or house, [3]) and arrowhead type 
(<<<<<, >>>>>, <<><<, or >><>>, [4]), with 4 trials in each of the 12 (= 3 x 4) 
combinations. The order of the 48 trials was randomized within each block for each 
participant.  
On each trial, participants were first presented with a priming stimulus (see Fig. 
4.4-A for sample images) for an average of 90ms (jittered between 70 and 110ms). Each 
priming stimulus was presented at the center of the screen with a visual angle of 2.2° x 
2.2°. The priming stimulus was followed by a fixation cross, which stayed on the screen 
for an average of 350ms (jittered between 300 and 400ms). The fixation cross was 
immediately followed by one of the four arrowhead sequences. Each arrowhead sequence 
occupied 0.4° of visual angle vertically and 2.2° horizontally. It was presented centrally 
for 100ms in white on black background. Participants were instructed to press one of two 
designated keys with the left or right index finger in accordance with the direction of the 
center arrowhead. They were given a maximum of 800ms to respond. 800ms after the 
response, the next trial started (see Fig. 4.4-B for trial structure). At the end of each block, 
a feedback screen was displayed. When the accuracy in a given block became higher 
(lower) than 90%, participants were encouraged to respond faster (more accurately) in the 
next block. 
Face images were created by FaceGen Modeller 3.3 (Singular Inversions Inc.). To 
eliminate any effects of in- vs. out-group status of the priming faces, we created race-
neutral morphed faces that included 50% Caucasian and 50% Asian faces. We scrambled 
the morphed face images to create scrambled face images. House images were adopted 






and house) did not differ significantly in all analyses below; so they were subsequently 
combined.  
Physiological Recording and Processing 
The EEG was recorded with 64 electrodes placed according to the extended 
International 10/20-System in a nylon cap, and referenced to the left mastoid. The 
electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from additional channels at the outer canthi of 
both eyes and above and below the left eye. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a 
band-pass of DC to 100Hz by the BioSemi ActiveTwo system, and sampled with 512Hz. 
All data were re-referenced to the averaged left and right mastoid, and re-sampled at 
256Hz. Response-locked ERP was obtained by extracting an epoch beginning 500ms 
before the response and ending 1000ms after the response. The data was baseline 
corrected by using 150ms-50ms pre-response voltage. Noisy trials were eliminated2, and 
the EEG was corrected for ocular artifacts (Gratton et al., 1983). A low-pass filter with a 
half-amplitude cutoff at 30Hz was applied. The EEG recordings for correct and incorrect 
responses were averaged separately. The ERN was quantified as the mean amplitude 
between 50ms before and 50ms after the incorrect response at the fronto-central midline 
electrode (FCz).  
Questionnaire Measures 
 Next, participants filled out a self-construal scale that was composed of selected 
items from the scales by Singelis (1994) and Takata (1999) (see Table 4.1). The scale 
yields separate scores for independent self-construal (αs = .79 and .67, for Asians and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The rejection rate was very low in all conditions (mean rejection rate = 6.44%, median rejection rate = 
5.00%), and did not differ between the experimental conditions, Fs <1. The number of error trials included 
in the analysis of the ERN was also no different across two cultural groups (Asians: M = 70.94, SE = 5.99, 
European Americans: M = 74.00, SE = 5.83), F(1, 35) < 1. This also did not significantly interact with 






European Americans, respectively) and interdependent self-construal (αs = .79 and .60). 
We also assessed personality variables that are linked to ERN, including neuroticism 
(NEO PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992; αs = .94 and .95), and self-consciousness (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975), both private (αs = .78 and .80) and public (αs = .60 and .78), and 
social anxiety (αs = .75 and .84).  
Results 
Behavioral Data 
Overall, the experimental condition had no effect on either accuracy (88.93 and 
88.62 in the face priming and the control conditions, respectively) or response time on 
error trials (273.40ms and 270.93ms, respectively), Fs < 1, ns, although, on correct trials, 
response time was shorter in the face priming condition than in the control condition 
(350.97ms vs. 352.82ms), F(1, 36) = 11.87, p < .01, ηp2 = .25.  
Our analysis implies that face priming would pose a social evaluative threat to 
those with interdependent self-construal. When threatened this way, people would 
become more vigilant to their errors. To test this analysis, we captured the degree to 
which face priming improved task performance by subtracting the accuracy in the face 
priming condition from the accuracy in the control condition to yield a measure of the 
face priming effect. Positive values indicate an improved performance in the face priming 
(vs. control) condition. Next, we developed a single index of interdependent self-
construal by subtracting independence from interdependence, since the two were 
negatively correlated (r = -.59, p < .001). Positive values indicate greater interdependence 
(vs. independence). One Asian participant was excluded from this analysis because she 






As predicted, the face priming effect on accuracy was significantly correlated 
with interdependent self-construal (r = .43, p < .01). As shown in Fig. 4.5-A, as a 
function of interdependent self-construal, performance tended to improve in the face 
priming (vs. control) condition. This is in line with the hypothesis that interdependent 
individuals are threatened by social eyes and, as a consequence, they become more 
vigilant for their own errors in the task. The correlation between the face priming effect 
on accuracy and interdependent self-construal remained significant when trait social 
anxiety, private and public self-consciousness, and neuroticism were controlled (r = .38, 
p < .05). There was no comparable effect on response time.   
As shown in Fig. 4.5-A, the relationship between interdependent self-construal 
and the face priming effect on accuracy was similar within each cultural group (rs = .25 
and .29, for Asians and European Americans, respectively), although it was no longer 
significant when analyzed separately. As predicted by the fact that Asians were 
significantly more interdependent (vs. independent) than European Americans (0.59 vs. -
0.74), F(1, 34) = 32.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, the face priming effect was significantly 
greater for Asians than for European Americans (1.00 vs. -0.04), F(1, 35) = 4.91, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .12. Indeed, the face priming effect was significantly positive, indicating that the 
incidental exposure to a face (vs. control) stimulus improved task performance for Asians, 
F(1, 17) = 5.21, p < .05, ηp2 = .23. This effect was absent for European Americans, F(1, 
18) < 1, ns.3  
Error-Related Negativity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The pattern here, showing a cultural influence on interdependence, which in turn leads to the face priming 
effect on accuracy, implies a mediation of the cultural difference on the face priming effect by 
interdependence. This interpretation of the data, however, should be espoused with caution because the 
implied mediation fell short of the conventional level of statistical significance; the 95% bias-corrected 






When people are threatened during the flanker task and thus become vigilant of 
their own errors, they may be expected to show an increased neural response to those 
errors. We thus calculated the degree to which face priming increased the magnitude of 
ERN by subtracting the face priming condition ERN from the control condition ERN. 
Positive values indicate larger ERNs in the face priming (vs. control) condition. As Fig. 
4.5-B illustrates, the face priming effect on ERN was significantly predicted by 
interdependent self-construal (r = .39, p < .05). As interdependent self-construal 
increased, the ERN in the face priming (vs. control) condition also increased. This 
provides support for the hypothesis that interdependent people are threatened by social 
eyes, which in turn increases neural reactions to errors they make. The correlation 
between the face priming effect on ERN and interdependent self-construal remained 
significant when trait social anxiety, private and public self-consciousness, and 
neuroticism were controlled (r = .40, p < .05). 
As shown in Fig. 4.5-B, however, when the relationship between interdependent 
self-construal and the face priming effect on ERN was analyzed separately within each 
cultural group, it was significant for Asians (r = .47, p < .05), but not for European 
Americans (r = -.13, ns). It is not clear why the correlation was negligible for the 
European American group. One possible reason is that the range of interdependence was 
relatively narrow for European Americans, which might have made it more difficult to 
detect the relationship with the face priming effect on ERN. Nevertheless, in support of 
the proposition that the face priming effect on ERN increases as a function of 
interdependent self-construal, this effect was significantly larger for Asians than for 






priming effect was significantly larger than zero for Asians, F(1, 17) = 4.20, p = .05, ηp2 
= .20. Curiously, this effect was reversed, albeit marginally, for European Americans, F(1, 
18) = 3.36, p = .08, ηp2 = .16. Pertinent waveforms are displayed in Fig. 4.6. As can be 
seen, the ERN magnitude was larger in the face priming condition than in the control 
condition for Asians, but the pattern was reversed for European Americans. Although this 
reversal was only marginally significant (see above), it became significant once we 
controlled for the condition difference in accuracy in the analysis of the ERN, F(1, 17) = 
4.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .23. We will return to this curious reversal effect in Discussion. 
As noted above, interdependent self-construal was significantly higher for Asians 
than for European Americans (0.59 vs. -0.74). Moreover, for Asians we found a robust 
correlation between self-construal and the face priming effect on ERN. We thus 
estimated what face priming effect Asians might show if their interdependence score 
were equal to the average score for the current sample of European Americans (= -0.74). 
This estimate of face priming effect for Asians (= -1.04) was virtually identical to the 
mean face priming effect for European Americans (= -0.74), F < 1.4 This pattern is 
consistent with the supposition that Asians showed the face priming effect that was 
opposite of the effect shown by European Americans because they were predominantly 
more interdependent (vs. independent). 
Discussion 
Face is a prominently social cue, which can signal that the self is being observed 
by others. Social observation like this implies social evaluation, which in turn can evoke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It may be hypothesized that culture influences interdependence, which in turn enhances the face priming 
effect on ERN. This implied mediation, however, was not significant (95% bias-corrected bootstrap CI, [-
.655, 1.812]), because the correlation between interdependence and the face priming effect on ERN was 






a social evaluative threat to the self, especially for those who are interdependently 
oriented. Our work is the first in the literature to test this analysis with both a behavioral 
measure (task performance) and a neuro-cortical response (error-related negativity or 
ERN). Both of them are thought to capture an enhanced vigilance for one’s errors on a 
task at hand. To the extent that mere exposure to a watching face is sufficient to evoke a 
social evaluative threat to the self, task performance should improve and, simultaneously, 
the ERN should be amplified. We showed, as predicted, that these effects do occur, but 
importantly they do so only to those who define themselves in interdependent terms.  
In the present work, we first assessed the degree to which performance in the 
flanker task improved in the face priming (relative to control) condition. As expected, the 
face priming effect on accuracy was significantly correlated with interdependent (vs. 
independent) self-construal. This correlation remained unchanged when pertinent 
personality variables such as neuroticism, private and public self-consciousness, and 
social anxiety were controlled. Second, as also predicted by the hypothesis that Asians 
are more interdependent than European Americans, we observed that the face priming 
effect on accuracy was significantly positive for Asians, indicating their improved task 
performance in the face priming (vs. control) condition. This effect, however, was 
completely absent for European Americans. Third, when a comparable analysis was 
carried out on the ERN, the face priming effect was significantly correlated with 
interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal. This correlation remained statistically 
significant when the relevant personality variables were controlled. Fourth, as also 






priming increased Asians’ ERN magnitude, relative to control primes. Curiously, this 
face priming effect on ERN was reversed for European Americans. 
Two observations suggest that the reversal of the face priming effect for European 
Americans must be interpreted with caution. First, no comparable effect was evident in 
the analysis of accuracy in the task performance, and second the observed reversal of the 
face priming effect on ERN became statistically significant only when the condition 
difference in accuracy was statistically controlled. Nevertheless, this effect could indicate 
that for those with independent selves, social eyes might automatically initiate motivation 
to counter any evaluation apprehension, supposedly because such apprehension could 
expose the vulnerability of the self to social evaluations, thus compromising the sense of 
the self as independent and autonomous. Such defensive mechanisms, if operative, might 
diminish any vigilance to one’s errors on the task at hand. This might explain why an 
exposure to such eyes reduced the ERN amplitude for European Americans (see Na & 
Kitayama, 2012 for initial support for this analysis). 
In an important study, Hajcak and colleagues (2005) examined effects of social 
observation on the ERN magnitude. Specifically, in their study, the experimenter stood 
right next to the participants who performed a flanker task. Furthermore, the participants 
had been explicitly informed that the experimenter would be evaluating their 
performance. Thus, evaluation apprehension was explicitly induced. Under this condition, 
the participants showed a reliably increased ERN relative to a control condition where 
they performed the task in a private setting. Because the participants who were tested are 
likely to be predominantly European Americans, we may suggest that even independent 






observer. What distinguishes interdependent selves from independent selves may lie in 
the fact that interdependent selves are more sensitive to subtle social cues implying a 
social evaluative threat, such that they automatically experience evaluation apprehension 
when they are merely “seen” by others. Consistent with this analysis, Ishii, Kobayashi, 
and Kitayama (2010) report, also with an ERP as their dependent variable, that 
interdependent people become especially sensitive to emotional vocal tone (which often 
conveys interpersonal attitudes; Ambady, Koo, Lee, & Rosenthal, 1996; Zuckerman, 
Amidon, Bishop, & Pmerantz, 1982) when exposed to schematic faces that would appear 
“watching” them. 
Although the current work focused exclusively on a social evaluative threat 
experienced by interdependent selves, we do not wish to imply that independent selves 
are immune from any self-threat. To the contrary, previous work strongly suggests that 
independent selves tend to experience a strong threat to the self when positive qualities of 
one’s internal features such as abilities and personality traits are questioned (e.g., 
Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Miller & Ross, 1975). Independent selves may well show 
an increased ERN under such conditions. Another type of threatening situation happens 
when individuals anticipate to be negatively evaluated by other people because of their 
membership in a stigmatized group. This state of stereotype threat (Steele, Spencer, & 
Aronson, 2002) may also produce an increased ERN. Future work addressing these 
possibilities might demonstrate that the magnitude of the ERN can be taken as a proxy of 
threat-in-general to the self.   
Our finding can be located squarely at the intersection of social and cognitive 






interdisciplinary field of cultural neuroscience (Chiao, in press; Han & Northoff, 2008; 
Kitayama & Park, 2010; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). Using various ERP components, 
including P300 (Lewis, Goto, & Kong, 2008) and N400 (Goto, Ando, Huang, Yee, & 
Lewis, 2010; Ishii et al., 2010), researchers have observed sizable cultural differences in 
brain responses. So far, however, much of this evidence is confined to contextual 
processing, with Asians shown to be more holistic in attention, as compared to European 
Americans. The present work provides novel evidence that the ERN can be used to 
identify cultural variations in social evaluative threats. Along with other recent ERP 
studies that show that face processing is modulated by the motivational significance of 
the face (Grasso, Moser, Dozier, & Simons, 2009), the present work suggests that culture 
plays a significant role in regulating one’s vigilance for social threats from the very 






















Table 4.1 20-item self-construal scale used in Study 4 
 
Independence 
1. I always try to have my own opinions. (T) 
2. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. (S) 
3. The best decisions for me are the ones I made by myself. (T) 
4. In general I make my own decisions. (T) 
5. I act the same way no matter whom I am with. (S) 
6. I am not concerned if my ideas or behavior are different from those of other people. (T) 
7. I always express my opinions clearly. (T) 
8. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. (T) 
9. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. (S) 
10. I do my own thing, regardless of what others think. (S) 
Interdependence 
11. I am concerned about what people think of me. (T) 
12. In my own personal relationships I am concerned about the other person's status 
compared to me and the nature of our relationship. (T) 
13. I think it is important to keep good relations among one's acquaintances. (T) 
14. I avoid having conflicts with members of my group. (T) 
15. When my opinion is in conflict with that of another person's, I often accept the 
other opinion. (T) 
16. I respect people who are modest about themselves. (S) 
17. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in. (S) 
18. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than 
my own accomplishment. (S) 
19. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me. (S) 
20. Depending on the situation and the people that are present, I will sometimes 
change my attitude and behavior. (T) 
  
Note. The self-construal scale was composed of selected items from the Singelis self-
construal scale (S; 1994) and the Takata’s scale (T; 1999). The scale has 10 items 
measuring independence (4 from the Singelis scale and 6 from the Takata’s scale) and 10 
items measuring interdependence (4 from the Singelis scale and 6 from the Takata’s 
scale). We added items from the Takata’s scale to assess social anxiety that is not covered 












Figure 4.1 ERN (error-related negativity) and CRN (correct-response negativity) waveforms at FCz (A: European Americans, C: 
Asians) and topographic maps of the ERN peak (error-correct difference) at 30-40ms after the response (B: European Americans, 
D: Asians) in Study 4. In the topographic maps, blue colors represent regions of greater negativity. This view shows the top of the 
head, with the nose pointing upward. The scalp maximum of the ERN occurs at the FCz electrode, indicated by the white cross.  
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Figure 4.2 ERN-CRN amplitude (A) and post-error slowing (B) in the self-condition and 





















































































Figure 4.3 The scatterplots with the interdependent self-construal on the X-axis and the 






























































Figure 4.4 (A) Sample face, scrambled face, and house image. (B) Schematic diagram 
























Figure 4.5 The scatterplots with the interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal on 

































Figure 4.6 ERN (error-related negativity) and CRN (correct-response negativity) 





















































Over the last two decades, substantial progress has been made in examining 
cultural differences in a variety of psychological processes. It has been suggested that 
these processes are shaped by culturally specific tools, customs and practices, and tasks 
that are integrated into coherent themes and values such as independence or 
interdependence (for a review, see Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). This dissertation sought to 
extend the current literature in cross-cultural psychology by examining the cognitive, 
emotional, and motivational processes associated with independence or interdependence 
by comparing Western and East Asian cultures. Furthermore, in order to understand the 
mechanisms of the interaction between culture and the mind, some neural underpinnings 
of cultural variations were explored. In pursuing these goals, I used an integrative 
approach that incorporates methods from multiple levels of analysis, including behavioral 
tasks (in Chapter II), surveys (in Chapter III), and neuroscience methodology (in Chapter 
IV).  
Chapter II explored cultural differences in implicit attitudes toward independence 
or interdependence. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been utilized extensively as 
a primary means to assess implicit attitudes (Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald et al., 
2009). However, it has not yet been employed in research on independence and 




individuals’ implicit value endorsement of independence (vs. interdependence). As 
predicted, Americans held more favorable implicit attitudes toward independence (vs. 
interdependence) relative to Japanese. Furthermore, Americans were relatively more 
independent than Japanese on three additional implicit measures. In contrast to the 
implicit measures, however, the results from two explicit measures of independence and 
interdependence were anomalous at best. This pattern of data provides converging 
evidence for the cultural task analysis that cultural difference is especially strong when 
implicit (vs. explicit) psychological tendencies of independence (vs. interdependence) are 
tested (Imada & Kitayama, 2009; Kitayama et al., 2009). 
In Chapter III, I conducted two studies to test cultural variation in emotional 
processes. Study 2 examined whether the linkage between social status and anger 
expression was moderated by culture. In doing so, I focused on two distinct functions of 
anger. Whereas people sometimes express anger to vent their frustration, they often 
express it to display their social status, power, and dominance. While both aspects of 
anger are observed in almost every culture, their salience or significance can vary as a 
function of culture, depending on the nature of the self (independence vs. 
interdependence) that is sanctioned in each culture. In independent cultures, where 
personal goals are self-defining, people may tend to express anger to vent their 
frustration, while in interdependent cultures, where social hierarchy and roles are self-
defining, people may tend to express anger to display dominance and power over others. 
As one’s social standing becomes higher, one is likely to experience frustration less while 
displaying dominance more. In accordance with this analysis, I found that Americans 






in ranking within their community, while Japanese reportedly expressed anger more 
frequently when they had higher (vs. lower) objective social status. Furthermore, the 
effect of social status on anger expression was significantly mediated by self-reported 
feelings of frustration for Americans and decision authority for Japanese.  
Study 3 explored the boundary conditions under which receipt of social support is 
most beneficial. Bolger and Amarel (2007) surprisingly argued that perceived receipt of 
social support brings about little benefit to health and adjustment. Study 3 presented a 
rather nuanced explanation of this issue. American data showed that the association 
between social support and health was negligible, thereby providing strong evidence for 
Bolder and Amarel’s claim. In contrast, the association between perceived receipt of 
social support and health and wellbeing was significantly positive among Japanese (from 
a support-approving culture) under some specific conditions, especially when the person 
at issue was concurrently experiencing life difficulties (support-requiting situational 
factor) and relatively low neuroticism (support-accepting personal styles). This supports 
the argument that the interdependent values of Japan mitigate the emotional costs of 
receiving support, especially when the person has legitimate reasons for receiving support 
and is non-neurotic. 
 Chapter IV sought to explore the neural bases of cultural variation in motivational 
processes. In particular, Study 4 identified a neural substrate of the motivational force 
towards self-interest (i.e., self-centric motivation or SCM). Both European American and 
Asian participants performed a flanker task to increase reward points for themselves or 
their close friend. European Americans were more strongly motivated to perform the task 






interest of their friend. As a consequence, in the self-condition, they showed greater 
neural response to errors (as reflected in the greater ERN amplitude) and used these 
errors to improve their future performance (as reflected in the greater post-error slowing). 
It is noteworthy that such strong self-centric effects appeared in the ERN and in post-
error slowing (but not in self-report measures), which tend to occur automatically and 
unconsciously, thereby suggesting the primacy and robustness of the SCM. To the 
contrary, there was no such effect of self-centric motivation among Asians, consistent 
with prior cross-cultural work that self-serving biases are much weaker in Asian cultures.  
 Finally, Study 5 explored a neural substrate of social evaluative threat and its 
influence on task vigilance. As a trigger of social evaluative threat, I presented an image 
of a human face while both European American and Asian participants performed a 
flanker task. Such a face image was hypothesized to evoke a strong social evaluative 
concern, especially for those who are interdependently oriented. As predicted, 
interdependent individuals showed enhanced vigilance for their task performance when 
primed with faces. They monitored their performance more closely (as revealed in the 
enhanced ERN amplitude) and improved their behavioral task performance (as revealed 
in higher accuracy) under the social evaluative threat in the face priming condition. Also, 
as predicted by the hypothesis that Asians are more interdependent than European 
Americans, the face priming effects were much stronger for Asians than for European 
Americans on both the ERN and accuracy.  
Implications and Future Directions 
Taken together, the findings in these studies clearly show that the cultural model 






emotional (Studies 2 & 3), and motivational processes (Studies 4 & 5). Cultural 
differences were pronounced not only in behavioral tendencies and self-reports, but also 
in neural responses. Next, I discuss important implications stemming from these findings. 
Culture and cognition. Chapter II provides support for the cultural task analysis, 
which suggests that active engagement in selected cultural tasks makes associated 
psychological tendencies habitual and implicit. This process may, in turn, eventually 
influence underlying brain mechanisms (Schwartz & Begley, 2003). In fact, recent work 
on neural plasticity and epigenesis (Gunnar, Morison, Chisholm, & Schuder, 2001; 
Meaney & Syzf, 2005; Suomi, 1999) has suggested that non-genetic, environmental 
factors, such as repeated practice for acquiring a certain skill (e.g., abacus use), can lead 
to dramatic changes in the neural connectivity of the brain or even gene expression. This 
emerging literature underscores the significance of cultural rituals – repeated engagement 
in cultural tasks of independence or interdependence – in neural development. Therefore, 
future research will benefit from exploring whether the Study 1 findings on the 
behavioral measures of implicit independence (vs. interdependence) extend to the brain 
pathways involved in implicit attitudes (e.g., Chee, Sriram, Soon, & Lee, 2000).  
Study 1 also showed that there is little coherence among implicit measures of 
independence (vs. interdependence). This finding is consistent with Kitayama et al. 
(2009) and Na et al. (2010). It also supports the cultural task analysis that individuals 
differ substantially in the specific cultural tasks they select to attain their cultural mandate, 
although all the members of one culture share their deep commitment to that mandate. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates this point by suggesting that individuals develop very distinctive 






select and pursue throughout their lives. Such a distinctive individual profile of 
independence, which is expected to vary across individuals but to be stable across time, 
can serve as a meaningful signature of the person’s cultural orientation (see Mischel & 
Shoda, 1995, for similar discussions). Future work should add more idiographic 
approaches to this area of research to investigate the specific profiles of independence or 
interdependence individuals acquire through socialization and how this cultural 
acquisition is related to the development of social and personal identities.  
Culture and emotion. Study 2 showed that anger expression either increases or 
decreases as a function of social status across cultures. Although cultural psychologists 
have become increasingly interested in within-cultural variations such as social status, 
regional variation, and demographic variables (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kraus et al., 
2010; Stephens et al., 2007; Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008; Varnum & Kitayama, 
2011), there has been little consideration of whether these factors have similar or 
different effects across cultures. Study 2 showed that the direction of the relationship 
between social status and anger expression is moderated significantly by culture, thereby 
underscoring the importance of the function of social status under the rubric of macro-
social conditions such as culture.  
Study 2 also demonstrated that there is a substantial cross-cultural difference in 
the aspect of social status that is most effective in a given culture. Social hierarchy 
matters for both Americans and Japanese. Anger expression was negatively linked to 
social status among Americans, while it was positively linked to social status among 
Japanese. But, the social status-anger expression linkage was particularly strong when 






people perceive their relative standing in a community), while the social status-anger 
expression linkage was more pronounced when social status was assessed with an 
objective measure for Japanese (e.g., in terms of educational attainment or occupational 
status) (see also Curhan et al., 2012 for similar observations). This finding is consistent 
with previous cross-cultural observations demonstrating the importance of subjectivity 
(vs. objectivity) in Western (vs. Asian) cultures (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007; Suh et al., 
1998). Future work should explore the origin of the cultural difference in the relative 
emphasis on subjective vs. objective social status. 
In Study 3, I found that the association between support and health was most 
strongly evident among Japanese (from a support-approving cultural context), who 
reported high life stress (in a support justifying situation), especially when they were low 
in neuroticism. This finding underscores the importance of examining the dynamic 
interplay among culture, situation, and personality to better understand how socio-
cultural environments shape psychological tendencies. 
Culture and motivation. Studies 4 and 5 examined research questions at the 
intersection of cultural psychology and social and affective neuroscience. It has been 
amply demonstrated that brain processes are shaped by repeated engagement in certain 
scripted behaviors, cultural tools, or practices (e.g., Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Dehaene, 
Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999; Maguire et al., 2000; Tang et al., 2006). It has 
also become increasingly clear that social-cultural environments mold such experiences, 
cultural tools, and practices. Despite this, there has been little effort to integrate research 
on “culture” and “the brain” into both the fields of neuroscience and cultural psychology. 






cultural variation in self-serving bias and social evaluative threat. With ERPs, which have 
extremely high temporal resolution, I found that cultural modulation was evident in both 
phenomena in a very early stage of information processing, thereby suggesting the 
primacy and robustness of cultural modulation. Specifically, I assessed error-related 
negativity (ERN), which occurs only 50-100ms after an error is made, as an indicator of 
motivational significance (in Study 4) and threat response (in Study 5). With traditional 
behavioral measures such as reaction time, recall, or self-report, it is almost impossible to 
detect these cultural modulations that take place so early in information processing.  
In particular, Study 4 suggests the existence of a strong motivational force 
underlying self-serving bias. Future research can directly test this idea by administering 
several existing measures of self-serving bias to validate whether the ERN-based marker 
of self-centric motivation predicts these measures. Another interesting avenue of research 
would be to examine the long-term consequences of self-centric motivation. Is it healthy 
to have strong self-centric motivation, especially in the context of close relationships? 
One interesting way to address this issue would be to examine the consequences of self-
centric motivation on marital satisfaction and relational wellbeing among couples.  
In Study 5, I reasoned that for those with interdependent selves, social eyes are 
self-threatening because they evoke social evaluative concerns. Because of the threat, 
people increase vigilance to their own errors in a task at hand. According to this analysis, 
the ERN was used as a proxy for perceived self-threat. This of course is not to say that 
cognitive functions of conflict monitoring and error detection, which are often ascribed to 
ERN (Botvinick et al, 2001; Yeung et al., 2004), are unimportant. To the contrary, 






do exist (Hajcak, 2012; Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, in press; Kitayama & Park, 2012; 
Weinberg et al., in press). Future work should more closely examine interactions between 
the cognitive and the affective or motivational functions of the ERN to achieve a better 
understanding of mechanisms underlying error processing.  
Summary. Researchers have documented that many psychological findings are 
limited to people from Western, Industrial, Educated, Rich, and Democratic (or WEIRD) 
societies (Henrich et al., 2010). This dissertation suggests that there are substantial cross-
cultural differences in a variety of psychological tendencies including implicit attitudes, 
anger expression, benefits of social support, the primacy of self-interest, and sensitivity to 
social evaluative threat. Most of the findings in this research, however, come from 
comparisons between American and Asian cultures. Although these comparisons are 
informative and useful, the field should now be pushed forward in different directions by 
comparing other cultural groups (e.g., Western Europe vs. South East Asian countries), 
regions (American West vs. East), socioeconomic groups (education or occupational 
prestige), or demographic groups (e.g., age or gender).  
Concluding Remarks 
The present research adopts established theoretical frameworks of cultural 
psychology as its starting point, but builds on them by testing previously unexplored 
questions in each of three domains of psychological experiences – cognition, emotion, 
and motivation. I suggest that the integrative consideration of the effects of culture on 
these three disparate domains can provide a more complete and nuanced understanding of 
how culture shapes human psychology. Furthermore, my exploration of the neural bases 






cultural modulation. Is culture no more than a superficial overlay on the human mind, or 
is it a critical environmental influence that actually changes brain pathways? I hope that 
my attempt to elucidate the interplay between culture, mind and the brain will provide a 
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